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## Near East/South Asia Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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8 June 1984

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IRAN CLANDESTINE NOTES ARMENIAN PROBLEMS

GF211010 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 20 May 84

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, the black reactionary regime ruling the country through its acts of terror and suffocation not only tramples the rights of the ethnic minorities in Iran in clear violation of the Iranian constitution but it is also oppressing the religious minorities and peoples having different faiths. The actions of the prejudiced and bigoted Iranian officials toward members of other faiths have become so numerous that recently a communique was issued in Tehran and other towns by a group of our Armenian countrymen regarding such policies.

In order to show how much this communique reveals the reactionary and anti-public nature of the superstitious chauvanistic officials of the Islamic regime we will now read some portions from the communique.

The communique begins by discussing the struggle of the Armenians against the oppression of the shahs, and recounts their participation in the Iranian revolution. It refers to the plots by U.S. Western imperialism and their henchmen, and recalls the struggle of the Armenians with other Iranians to defeat those plots and notes that there were even Armenian martyrs in this struggle.

The Iranian Armenians, it said, voted for the Iranian constitution. The constitution, despite its shortcomings, has officially recognized Armenian rights. However, unfortunately, the officials and the government of the Islamic Republic, quite contrary to its promises, are trampling the principles of the constitution.

While revealing the lawbreaking of Islamic officials, the Armenian countrymen said that the prime ministry has issued guidelines on Armenian schools and religious institutions. Article 13 of the constitution says that the religious minorities are free to act according to their own preference in the matter of personal faith and religious education. Article 15 of the constitution allows teaching of minority languages and the spread of religious literature on a par with the teachings of the Persian language.

The communique said that the government, the prime ministry and the Department of Education and Culture are asking the Armenians to learn the Persian language.

For example those religious books that have been recommended by the Education Department for Armenian schools are all in the Persian language and are written by Muslim authors.

The publishers of the communique also wrote about the incorrect and discriminatory attitude of officials of the Department of Education and Culture. It is as if Islamic religious books are being written by Christian authors, in the Armenian language, and with instructions to be taught in Armenian language.

In the official program for schools, 2 hours a week have been allotted to teaching the Armenian language. A group of our Armenian countrymen have correctly reached the conclusion that these measures really are meant to eradicate the language and culture of Armenians. No doubt these acts by Iranian officials are aimed at the most rights of the minorities and especially against the Iranian Armenians. These acts are condemned by free Iranians.

The communique also said that the Iranian people have a government which claims to oppose nationalism but is in practice pursuing a policy of apartheid. The government also claims to be against oppression but is in practice using pressure and coercion. The government which claims to be a popular one is in practice engaged in anti-people policies. What the Islamic regime is doing toward the Armenians it is also doing so to all other peoples in Iran.

The only way out of this situation is the unity of all peoples and groups. The national and religious minorities in Iran must launch a united struggle to achieve the aims of the revolution.

CSO: 4640/240

# FISHING SECTOR PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 16 Apr 84 p 16

[Text] (APS)--Despite the naturally advantageous conditions represented by over 1,200 kilometers of coast offering an abundance of fish, Algeria's fishing industry experienced a period of stagnation and even recession that lasted many years (from just after independence to the early 1970's). The effects are far from having disappeared even today.

With some 204 sardine boats, about 100 trawlers, and 378 small fishing craft registered in 1979, the fishing fleet--operating mostly with wornout equipment and frequently brought to a standstill by the lack of spare parts--could not hope to fulfill suitably the role expected of it in helping to make the country self-sufficient in animal protein, even though, because of the unpredictable weather which regularly affects agricultural production and live-stock, fish have always been considered one of the most dependable sources of protein.

Promotion of the fishing industry has been hampered by a number of factors, among them the absence of a development program and of an efficient supporting infrastructure: congested fishing ports, the absence of repair yards and ship-building facilities, and the difficulty involved in providing a proper and regular supply of miscellaneous gear and equipment.

As a result of that situation, naturally, the industry was almost totally dependent on other countries for all the equipment needed for its operations. Added to that were the lack of leadership, a particularly low level of training (several seaman's apprentice schools providing basic training were closed in 1969), a small public sector whose catch did not exceed 10 percent of the total, and a private sector which, while highly dominant, was poorly equipped, unorganized, and uncontrolled. Lastly, administration was inefficient and needed to be beefed up and decentralized.

The other aspect of this entire picture that needed to be reviewed and corrected concerned the socioprofessional situation of seamen registered with the fishing industry and affiliated with the seamen's social protection agency.

Despite the establishment in 1963 of the National Fishing Office, whose activities were centered basically on the processing of products from the sea, and then its replacement in 1969 by the Algerian Fishing Office, which marked the public sector's entry into fishing activities, it was not until 1979, when the State Secretariat for Fishing was established, that a well-considered and long-term policy for this industry was finally adopted.

#### New Organization

It was not until that period that the objectives assigned to the fishing sector were clearly established and immediately made a part of the first 5-year plan. Those objectives were concerned with a reorganization of the method of exploiting fishing resources, the setting up of an infrastructure in support of production, the ordering and implementation of a training system, and the establishment of a center for applied research.

Setting up an infrastructure in support of production is the responsibility of ECOREP [National Enterprise for Fishing Boat Construction and Repair and for Supplying and Manufacturing Fishing Gear], which was established for the purpose and entrusted with manufacturing and marketing fishing gear. The result was:

1. The start of production at a shipyard in Khemisti, which since June 1981 has supplied over 80 fishing boats to registered seamen.
2. The establishment of an identical shipyard in Beni Saf in 1982, where production has also started.
3. The opening of another shipyard in Bejaia, also now in production.
4. The opening of sales outlets for fishing gear in all the coastal ports.
5. The strengthening and dynamization of activities at the repair facilities in Oran and Algiers, with centralized sales outlets being set up in each region for the supplying of spare parts and marine engines.
6. The establishment of a regional repair facility in Ghazaouet, with branches in Beni Saf and Mostaganem.

Also established during the same period was ENAPECHES (National Fishing Enterprise), which is responsible for production by the public sector's fleet and for all activities in connection with the processing, importing, and marketing of fish.

Parallel with that, the new national policy for organizing the fishing sector resulted, during 1981 and 1982, in the reorganization of production and the expansion and modernization of the fleet, which in 1983 comprised 304 sardine boats, 250 trawlers, 79 seining trawlers, and 623 small fishing boats.

To increase the fleet, the government granted 290 licenses in 1978 and 1979 to private individuals to import fishing boats with a total value of 500 million

dinars. In addition, to develop small-scale fishing--referred to as "small boats"--over 200 boats ranging in length from 7.5 to 12 meters were assigned to registered seamen in the coastal governorates, the objective being a better deployment of the fleet in favorable zones.

The fleet for catching bluefish--by far the most popular fish with consumers--was beefed up in the big ports supplying such heavily populated zones as Ghazaouet, Beni Saf, Oran, Mostaganem, Cherchell, Zemmouri, Jijel, Skikda, Annaba, and El-Kala.

Lastly, thanks to more flexible procedures for granting "fishing cards," the crews increased from 3,746 fishermen in 1979 to 9,570 at the end of 1983.

All those actions have resulted in a notable revival of fishing activity and an increase in production. Production ranged from 20,000 to 35,000 tons annually before 1979, but by 1983 it had risen to about 77,000 tons, and it should be possible to increase that figure to 100,000 tons if the resources are exploited rationally. The government has now suspended the granting of permits for new boats as a means of conserving those resources in Algerian waters.

According to studies undertaken on the initiative of the former State Secretariat for Fishing, fishing resources in the waters along the Algerian coast total approximately 326,450 tons. According to the same studies, and taking the biomass into account, the biologically sustainable catch should not exceed 100,000 tons per year.

#### Promising Future

The policy to be pursued in the future will be centered on the introduction of more powerful boats for operation in zones suitable for trawling outside the 12-mile limit, where fishing is carried on at greater depths.

In the field of training, considerable efforts have been undertaken through the establishment of five schools providing basic training. They have been in operation since 1981 in Annaba, Collo, Mostaganem, Oran, and Beni Saf. In addition, an Institute of Fishing Technology has opened its doors in Algiers to provide training courses for fishing boat skippers, electric motor mechanics, and first mates.

A Fishing Research Center, working in cooperation with the experimental station in Beni Saf, has started work to prepare a proper evaluation of the nation's fishing resources and the exploitable potential and to demarcate new fishing zones by preparing and distributing fishing charts. The center's role also includes responsibility for the conservation of species, the biological equilibrium of the marine environment, and the spread of new fishing methods.

Along with the establishment of subdirectorates of fishing in all the coastal governorates, a broad program was launched beginning in 1980 to establish new fishing ports and harbors all along the Algerian coast and develop areas for the fishing fleet in mixed ports such as Mostaganem, Tenes, Bejaia, Jijel, and Annaba. In addition to development of the fishing ports in Cherchell, Collo,



Khemisti, and El-Kala, plans call for establishing fishing ports and harbors in Bouzedjar, Zemmouri, Azzeoun, Gouraya, Ziamma-Mansouriah, Honeine and Beni Paoua, Tighzirt, El-Marsa, and Chetaibi. All the studies in connection with those ports and harbors have been completed.

#### A Few Problems

Critical problems continue to exist due to inadequate facilities for lifting boats out of the water for repair and careening. In most of the fishing ports, those facilities have deteriorated or need to be replaced or installed.

The other important problem presenting itself is that of gaining control over statistics and the means of verifying production. This is very difficult because of the absence of onboard fishing inspectors and of facilities for overseeing the unloading of the boats, but also because of the absence of stricter supervision.

In another connection, this in relation to the Ministry of Finance, a favorable credit system has also been established for the acquisition, replacement, and modernization of boats. This should permit optimal exploitation by small-scale fishermen of the two-thirds of Algeria's continental shelf that consists of rocky bottoms not suitable for trawlers.

The guidelines laid down at the Fifth FLN Party Congress for optimal exploitation of the fishing resources "with a view to meeting the country's growing food needs" should now make it possible to set up a policy along the following lines:

1. Continued efforts aimed at the judicious exploitation of fishing resources through implementation of the appropriate means.
2. Adoption of the necessary measures for conserving fishing resources.
3. Continued development and modernization of the fishing fleet to make efficient means of production available to the fishermen.
4. Better maintenance and good use of the existing fishing ports and the establishment of new ports.
5. Lastly, the organization of deep sea fishing activities, for which the congress asked that all measures considered useful be implemented.

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## ARTICLE EXAMINES SITUATION IN COUNTRY

Melbourne THE AGE in English 5 May 84 pp 2-3

[Article by Kate Ahearne and Brendan Hennessy: "Creeping Fear Mars Life"]

[Text]

NAMES LIKE Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk can still conjure up romantic images of palm trees, 'National Geographic' Bedouin and Mediterranean beaches. But since the discovery of oil and the 1969 coup which deposed King Idris and brought Muammar Gaddafi to power, a more sinister image of Libya has emerged. Gaddafi's profile in the international Press is far from flattering — his befriending of the infamous Idi Amin, his involvement in the war in Chad, the hit squads sent to eliminate Libyan expatriates, his support for the IRA and the wrangle with the US over the Gulf of Sirte, which Gaddafi claims as territorial waters — the list of his misdemeanors goes on and on. He has been pronounced mad, arrogant, a megalomaniac.

In reading about Libya before we went there, yet another image evolved. According to Libyan information, Gaddafi's accession to power was not a coup but the Great September Revolution, whose aim has been to create a truly egalitarian society.

We saw brochures on redevelopment programs in everything from agriculture to the arts — all laudable enough we thought, and we read Gaddafi's Green Book in which he puts forward the Third Universal Theory, his answer to both communism and capitalism.

COMING IN to land at Benghazi, the first thing we noticed was the military presence. Squadrons of jet fighters lined the runways. Camouflaged anti-aircraft guns and communications installations were pocketed around the airport. The impression of military precision and readiness contrasted sharply with the chaos of the main terminal. Outside, crates of lost

or unclaimed baggage lay abandoned to the weather. Inside, hundreds of passengers rushed from counter to counter clamoring for attention and thrusting baggage claim tickets and documents under the noses of indifferent officials.

Surrounded by luggage and children, Arab women sat or crouched on the floor, many of them swathed in the traditional Libyan *barakan*, some hiding their faces by holding the cloth in their teeth.

Everywhere posters and slogans proclaimed the aims and achievements of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya — "PARTNERS NOT WAGE SLAVES", "THE GREEN BOOK ANNOUNCES TO THE PEOPLE THE HAPPY DISCOVERY OF THE WAY TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY". Portraits of Colonel Gaddafi dotted the walls. Gaddafi as Bedouin chief, as military leader, walking arm in arm with Abdel Nasser or with Syria's President Assad who had left Libya only a few days before.

Fortunately we were met by the university's public relations manager, Ahmed Bergatti, who slipped behind counters and in and out of offices. He returned with all our papers stamped and oiled us through customs. This was the first and last time we breezed through an encounter with Libyan officialdom. Speeding towards Benghazi, Bergatti litanised the achievements of the Jamahiriya (republic).

"Everybody happy in Libya. No crime here. Everybody have car. Everybody have video. All Libyans good Moslems," he intoned. He told us he had never been outside the country but was hoping to go to Australia on business for the university. We assured him that not everyone in Australia has videos.



Portraits of Gaddafi and Assad slid by on every second lamp post. On our right the Bennina housing project, capable of accommodating more than 90,000 people, rose in white concrete blocks out of a treeless wasteland. Closer to the city, houses in the old Arab quarters and the Italianate architectural reminders of a long history of foreign occupation were alike designated for demolition with the red-painted "X"s.

Rows of houses had been gouged out by bulldozers and new blocks of flats and offices sprouted from the rubble. But with the demolition well ahead of the redevelopment, parts of Benghazi looked like a city devastated by war.

We were booked into a hotel for "a week or two" until the university could organise a flat. We were still there six months later.

DESPITE HIS image in the Western media, Gaddafi is no fool. He is a shrewd political operator who seems to have convinced the Libyan people (and a certain calibre of Left-wing Western radical) that he is a great revolutionary thinker whose famous Green Book is going to change the world.

Muammar (he who builds up) Gaddafi (a voice from the desert) was born in the Sirte Desert in 1942, within earshot of the battle for control of North Africa. While still a junior high school student he had conceived his plan to overthrow the monarchy, and had begun secretly choosing and training the young boys who would carry it through. In a country where everyone knows their Koran, he had distinguished himself even at this age as a Koranic scholar.

Realising the importance of the army to the success of the coup, Gaddafi and his friends entered the military college in Benghazi. Later, while in Britain on a radio operators' course, he was deeply impressed by the lush green countryside and vowed that one day the Libyan Desert would be green.

After the coup, Gaddafi quickly rose to prominence in the Arab world. He saw himself as the heir-apparent to Abdel Nasser, the great exponent of Arab unity, and has attempted on different occasions to merge Libya with Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. But his brand of violent revolution has lost him credibility in the region, culminating in the Organisation of African Unity's boycott of last year's conference due to be held in Tripoli under Gaddafi's chairmanship.

On the home front Gaddafi maintains power with tight control over the military and a pervasive network of secret police. He has built up an elaborate propaganda machine that controls all the media and reaches into the schools and

universities in text books and compulsory courses on the Green Book.

In the local primary school we saw the children begin the day by parading in their blue uniforms, chanting "Al Fatah! Al Fatah!" and singing revolutionary songs. News broadcasts give an exhaustive daily round-up of what "Our Great Leader" did today. News of the outside world is reduced to footage of riots, disasters and anything that shows the West in a negative light. Foreign newspapers come with pages missing and with breasts, bums and any unfavorable reports about Libya blacked out.

Western pop music is considered degenerate and much frowned upon, but there is a thriving black market in home-made copies of illegal cassettes. On the other hand, cinemas specialise in violent B-grade movies, mostly American, with macho stars like Charles Bronson and Bruce Lee. From our hotel window we could see groups of youths practising kung fu on the roof tops.

LIKE ALL CLOSED societies, the Libyans are paranoid about their image in the outside world. Anyone carrying a camera is followed and pressured. Within two days of arriving in Benghazi we were stopped by a plainclothes member of the military police for taking photographs in the bazaar.

On another occasion, after obtaining permission from the local police, we were nevertheless arrested by the secret police for taking pictures of Libyan tile work. We asked what was wrong with photographing tile work. "You might be spies," they said. We were taken to headquarters and passed from officer to officer, right up to the Chief of Police, who checked our papers and said, "Forget about permission. Don't take photographs." When we complained, he smiled wryly and said: "Look, we have many problems. Many problems. Just put your cameras away."

Within a couple of weeks we reckoned we had picked out the secret police in the hotel. One was the hotel "driver" who sat in the foyer "reading" the paper. More imaginative were a young black couple who sat the same hours pretending to be in love. We were later told by Arab friends that we had missed a few.

The morality police were easily identified driving around in their white Peugeot 404s. One evening we went upstairs with a Greek man from the hotel and a female teacher to play bridge. As we emerged from the lift the manager came puffing up the stairs. "Mish kwaess. Mish kwaess," he panted. "No good. No good. The morality police have seen you. It is forbidden."

In the atmosphere of fear and distrust generated by the secret police, it is virtually impossible to know exactly what Libyans really think of the revolution. But we met two students from Tripoli who were prepared, in private, to say that they felt the majority of Libyans were anti-Gaddafi, but were too frightened to voice their opinions. One of them said that two of his relatives were among prisoners released to make room in the jails for anti-revolutionary students who had been purged from the secondary schools.

Ironically, the most telling incident we experienced in support of these claims occurred after we had finally left Libya. A young bureaucrat who had lost no opportunity to make life difficult for us in Benghazi, turned up in a London pub. He was drinking beer and smoking hashish in a pub (both illegal in the Jamahiriya) with a few of his Libyan mates. He greeted us like long-lost friends, explaining that he had been obliged to act the part of the rabid revolutionary in order to be allowed to go overseas to study. He assured us he had no intention of going back while Gaddafi was in power.

THE VAST oil reserves and Gaddafi's revolution have dragged Libya by the bootstraps into the 20th century. The reconstruction program, which is across the board, relies heavily on expensive imported expertise, making education one of Libya's most pressing problems.

Architecturally, Garyounis University is one of the show-places of the Jamahiriya, but for a multiplicity of reasons standards remain alarmingly low. There is a severe shortage of Arabic-speaking teachers and Arabic text-books, especially in the sciences where most courses have to be taught in English. But students in the engineering faculty, for instance, have voted English compulsory only for first year. The head of the English division in engineering where I worked, told me that in 10 years no student had passed through the course in the minimum eight semesters, and that an average of 10 students were graduating each year, while the intake of first-year students was around 250.

A contract in Libya is a forbidding prospect, but big salaries and bonuses are the carrot that attract most foreign workers. Nevertheless, expertise is generally of a poor quality. Teachers are often under-qualified or simply poor communicators — people who could not easily find jobs elsewhere.

Libyan life at all levels is controlled by decisions of the popular committees, and the problem is compounded, both inside and outside the university, by the requirement that all positions of authority be occupied by Libyans — the primary qualification being a demonstrated loyalty to the regime.

We never really understood paranoia until we went to Libya, where a healthy respect for it is an essential frame of mind. Other teachers warned me to watch out for spies and the more revolutionary students in my classes. Buck-passing is the rule for all dealings with the administration, and it is a triumph to get a decision from anyone for fear of repercussions. One day we arrived to find that most of the department in charge of academic staff had been replaced overnight and its most senior officer publicly disgraced.

There was an almost intangible barrier between students and foreign staff. Nothing controversial was discussed, and one American teacher who did become friendly, especially with the more revolutionary students, was dismissed. Our stay in Libya coincided with a period of growing militarisation, which was particularly evident on campus. The trend had begun in 1977, when a number of students were publicly executed for anti-revolutionary activities. The anniversary of this event was marked by the students with a week of celebrations.

Everyone except married women and men too old or infirm is expected to play a role in the military. Students attended classes in the morning and military training in the afternoons. At a popular committee meeting it was decided that the economics faculty, the least politicised on the campus, should be removed to Tobruk for a period of intensive training, but an acquaintance of ours, a civil engineer, had been working on the site for months before the meeting at which this "democratic" decision was taken.

Students come to class wearing Gaddafi T-shirts, badges and pendants. Essays on any subject are likely to end by singing the praises of Gaddafi and the revolution. Classes are frequently cancelled for political meetings and the often unannounced visits of "The Leader". The closest I ever came to seeing Gaddafi in the flesh was when I was ejected from a meeting hall in which he was about to address the students.

WITH AMBITIONS in Africa and the Arab world, but leading a population of only 3 million, Gaddafi must either win or coerce the support of Libyan women. To the young women he comes across as a super-hero — handsome and charismatic. He has taken them into the army, educated them, given them jobs and a dramatic new part to play, much wider than their traditional domestic role, in building a new society.

He has closed the gold *Soukhs*, the markets where Libyan men traditionally buy the gold for the bride payments and has reformed the marriage and divorce laws. But old values die hard. Reconciliation between old and new seems impossi-

ble in a culture where the number of a man's wives is a symbol of his success, where traditionally he can divorce a wife by turning to Mecca and saying three times, "I divorce thee" and women still walk behind their husbands in the street.

One night in the pouring rain, we hailed a taxi and jumped in the back with our son. The driver refused to move, and instructed us in broken English, "Man front. Woman back." We protested that we were married, pointing to our son. "No drive," he said. "Man front. Woman back." Rather than walk home in the rain we grudgingly did as he said.

Young Libyan women are still closely guarded. When we eventually moved from the hotel into a flat, our balcony overlooked the female students' hostel. The students were picked up by bus every morning from inside the compound gates and delivered back inside in the afternoon. Twice a week they were allowed out for two hours' shopping.

There are an enormous number of public holidays celebrating anything from the withdrawal of the British to the assassination of Anwar Sadat. These were celebrated by the girls marching around the quadrangle, carrying placards and chanting. When they marry they are expected to be *virgo intacta*. At the wedding of one of my students, an elderly relative of the bride told me that the couple would be taken to the home of the groom's parents, shut in a room and expected to hand out the bloodied sheet. The old women, she said, are not fooled by chicken blood. The status of Libyan women was summed up by an Arab friend who explained that women are "only 80 per cent" because the monthly bleeding affects their brains.

A lot of our time was spent standing in food queues and traipsing around Benghazi looking for basic necessities. Supplies were haphazard. Supermarkets might be full of chocolates, sweet biscuits, even cheap Russian caviar, but very little else. Meat, eggs, fresh milk and fruit were often impossible to find. When shipments did arrive people scurried to the stores. At our local supermarket we saw shoppers fighting over the small quotas of plastic buckets and Italian pasta.

The supply situation worsened dramatically during our time in Libya. The Gulf of Sirte incident led to President

Reagan's embargo on Libyan oil and his recall of all American citizens. Most of the teachers stayed, but the oil companies withdrew. Rumors were rife that the deserting Americans had sabotaged vital equipment as they had done pulling out of Iran.

At the same time, Libya was at loggerheads with Saudi Arabia over OPEC oil prices, holding out for higher prices with a glut on the world market. The flow of Libyan oil dropped, according to some estimates, to as little as 10 per cent of capacity. Massive anti-American demonstrations were mounted throughout Libya. Students marched down Abdel Nasser Street (some wearing Marlboro and Camel T-shirts) shouting anti-American slogans.

For the first time in its history the Jamahiriya was in financial straits. Libyan workers accepted substantial pay cuts. One Greek company that employed friends of ours was owed millions of dinars by the Libyans and had not been able to pay personnel for over 12 months. A list of banned imports was published, including many basic food items like cheese, butter, honey, tinned and dried vegetables and powdered milk.

When we arrived in Libya, the six-mile line was thick with ships waiting to unload in Benghazi (notoriously the slowest port in the Mediterranean). But when we left, almost two years later, supply had dwindled to the extent that there were never more than one or two.

GETTING INTO Libya is difficult. Getting out is almost impossible without employing a "fixer", a Libyan with connections in the various Ministries and departments that you require clearances from. Even so it can take weeks. One British teacher decided to go it alone, but after four days queuing at the Ministry of Housing, and still no documents, he succumbed. But a fixer cannot help with exit visas, plane tickets, the censor's clearance on books and cassettes, or the Jamahiriya Bank when it runs out of traveller's cheques, two days before you are due to leave.

After two years of queuing for eggs, wrangling with the university over contracts and conditions and being hassled by the secret police, we happily joined in the spontaneous hurrah that erupted on our British Caledonian flight as the plane headed into international airspace.

## OPPOSITION FRONT MOVES TO MILITARY RESISTANCE

Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic No 671, 15 May 84 pp 20-22

[Article by Rashid al-Salim: "He Who Sows the Wind Reaps the Storm"]

[Text] Last Tuesday, the Libyan capital of Tripoli witnessed a suicide operation seemingly aimed at eliminating the current regime. Following it, the Libyan authorities adopted more stringent security measures that gave evidence of the regime's fear of a coup attempt. Who undertook this operation, and why? What is the future of the political situation in Libya?

Although it is still too early to obtain precise information about the attempt and to analyse its dimensions, observers can make some basic observations in light of the available information. The available information has to do with the progress of the operation itself and the response of the Libyan authorities to it and the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, which has announced its responsibility for the operation.

When this information is placed within the context of the Libyan regime's public policy, aspects of a future image of Libya become visible. They contain much pain and blood.

## An Assassination Attempt

According to the information we have obtained from various journalistic sources, the bold operation was launched by 15 commandos against one of the fortified military barracks at al-'Aziziyah, where Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi was residing on the morning of last Tuesday. The operation ended after a few hours with the death of all the commandos. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya has announced its responsibility for the operation. According to our information, it was one in a series of operations being planned by the front with the goal of doing away with the Libyan regime. A front spokesman stated: "The recent attempt to assassinate President al-Qadhafi was only one in a series of attempts that shall end with his death." In an Arab capital, the secretary general of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, Dr Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqaryaf, said that last Tuesday's operation was nothing but the beginning of military activity inside the country. Dr al-Maqaryaf has told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI (Number 376--27 April 1984) that "We have become able to respond to violence with violence."

Dr al-Maqaryaf's statement is supported by an observation made by more than one observer, at any rate. It is that the National Front for the Salvation of Libya chose one of its most important leaders and symbols to lead the commando operation in person. He was Ahmad Ibrahim Ahwas, who, along with two comrades, crossed the Libyan border from the sea, evidently close to the Tunisian border. The regime's official account said that Ahmad Ahwas and his companions were arrested at the Libyan-Tunisian border after they had shown diplomatic passports and engaged in an armed clash with guards. As a result of the clash, it was said, Ahwas was fatally wounded, while his companions were seriously wounded. Doubt was cast upon this account by the French journalist Eric Rouleau in a question he posed to al-Qadhdhafi. In contrast to the official account, our information states that Ahmad Ahwas was able to enter Libya and hide for 2 weeks before his identity was discovered in an incident that remains obscure. The Libyan authorities interrogated his companions for 2 days without getting any information from them. This too conflicts with what the authorities have claimed. As a result, the authorities executed them in Green Square in Tripoli. Had the authorities obtained information on the groups, bases, and secret plans for resistance, the commando operation would not have been carried out on the date set for it. The group was able to reach the al-'Aziziyah barracks, where it occupied a position after a violent clash with the special guards in which RPG's and automatic weapons were used. However, the defenders were reinforced by tanks from inside al-'Aziziyah, according to the account by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, and the group was forced to move to a structure 1 kilometer away from the position. After they had resisted for about 7 hours, they were all killed. Tripoli television showed pictures of their corpses. Moreover, al-Qadhdhafi made a media appearance by showing up, machine gun in hand, in a group of officers in a horse racing field. It was an attempt on his part to give the impression that the capital was safe and that his authority had not been exposed to any danger!

#### Security Measures and Accusations

Since the discovery of Ahmad Ahwas and his companions, contradictory official Libyan statements have been issued concerning the location of the battle with them and the parties that are supposed to have paid and trained them. According to al-Qadhdhafi, they are Britain, America, and the Sudan. These countries have been quick to deny having any close or distant connections to the operation. After the operation took place last Tuesday, al-Qadhdhafi found no one to accuse except the Muslim Brotherhood! These are the persons al-Qadhdhafi has been working to arrest, torture, and frighten away since the beginning of his time in power. The fumbling by the Libyan authorities in the beginning caused relations with Tunis to grow tense. The Libyan authorities accused Tunis of assisting and sheltering the attackers. This indicates that the Libyan regime did not have any precise information about the commando operation or similar operations that have happened in Libya, such as the explosion that occurred in the weapons storehouse in Banghazi last March.

According to information coming from Tripoli, the regime has intensified security measures. Intensified military blockades have been erected in the



capital, while police officers and soldiers have been dressed in civilian clothing and sent looking for armed men! Moreover, the borders were closed for a limited period and measures were taken to prevent Arabs from traveling before obtaining permission from the Libyan authorities.

Among the parties that have not been spared the accusations of the Libyan regime are the Palestinians, whom it has called supporters of Abu Iyad, a member of the central committee of the Fatah movement.

According to the news services, the charge against the Palestinians resulted in hundreds of those who reside in Libya being arrested. Al-Qadhdhafi's conflict with Fatah is nothing new, since he has harrassed it with financial pressure and by fighting alongside the rebels in Tripoli [Lebanon]. However, the recent accusation springs less from this background than it does from the statement by the Libyan regime itself to the effect that Ahmad Ahwas and his two companions claimed to be of Palestinian extraction! This confirms the regime's clumsiness and the fear that possesses it of the organized Libyan opposition. This fear causes it to imagine that everyone who has been harmed at all is conspiring against it! Otherwise, how is it possible to explain the contradictions and clumsiness displayed in the statements and actions of the Libyan regime just as the National Front for the Salvation of Libya was announcing its responsibility for the operation and its intention to escalate military activity within Libya? This brings us to the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. Why did it arise?

#### The Libyan Opposition

The National Front for the Salvation of Libya was founded on 7 October 1981. Its formation was announced in London. The name of its general secretary, Dr Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqaryaf, was also announced. He is one of those Libyan politicians who could not bear the regime's policy. The front contains many important Libyans who are united by their resentment of the policy of the Libyan regime. Some have been exposed to the regime's terrorism directly, while others have felt it indirectly. They include cabinet ministers, ambassadors, journalists, writers, professors, and students of numerous intellectual orientations and tendencies. Beside the limitation of freedoms, perhaps one of the most important reasons for the growth of the Libyan opposition has been the adoption by the regime of ideas that are inconsistent with the noble Sunnah of the Prophet. In addition, modifications have been made in some religious sayings and Qur'anic meanings. May God forbid, but the Green Book has been given a station above that of the Qur'an.

One of the founders of the front was Ahmad Ibrahim Ahwas, the man who engineered the recent commando operation. He was one of al-Qadhdhafi's comrades at the military college and he graduated before him. He was arrested and imprisoned after the First of September coup. Al-Qadhdhafi then tried to win him over by means of diplomatic posts. Ahwas occupied the posts of Libyan charge d'affairs in Aden, Somalia, Denmark, Malaysia, and Guyana. However, Ahwas announced his resignation in February 1981 and helped al-Maqaryaf found the National Salvation Front.

It was natural for the front to receive support from various Libyan popular circles both inside and outside the country. These circles are of varying intellectual and political levels.

Although Ahmad Ahwas pushed for and insisted on getting the task of carrying out the commando operation, with the agreement of the front's general secretary, the fact remains that he was the leading personality in the front. Thus, an observer can only feel confused with regard to the reason that led the front to sacrifice one of its prominent leaders in such an operation.

The rational reason, to which we are inclined in light of the lack of information in this regard, is that the front has decided to initiate a sustained military confrontation with the Libyan regime, just as its spokesman said. Thus, the front decided to have the first operation be undertaken by a man who was one of its most prominent military and political leaders at one and the same time. In this way, it could show the Libyan people that zero hour had arrived. The operation also makes one think that the front has become confident of its ability to terminate the Libyan regime. If things are otherwise, then the front has gained nothing in return for the loss of one of its most prominent leaders through this action. The operation could also be a bridge across which the regime will move in order to liquidate all its opponents! At any rate, it was an operation characterized by boldness and a willingness to take on risks.

Although the information concerning the operation and its various dimensions is still not complete, neutral observers think that the contradictory official Libyan statements and the clumsy countermeasures taken by the authorities give indirect confirmation to the idea that 8 May 1984 was the beginning of a new era of military resistance against the Libyan regime. Although all the members of the group were eliminated, the particulars of the operation, as we have mentioned them, give the impression that members of the army and guard units cooperated with the group. If so, this would have facilitated the group's arrival at al-'Aziziyah barracks, where al-Qadhdhafi stays. For him, it is a safe refuge surrounded by cement barricades, radar units, tanks, and all manner of security precautions. This causes observers to think that the Libyan opposition is strong and bold. What will the future of the political situation in Libya be?

The days to come will answer this question.

12224

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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF IRAQ'S BATTLEFRONT GIVEN

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2579, 28 Mar 84 pp 28-31

[Article by Usamah Hajjaj: "Important Details From the Iraqi-Iranian Front. Israelis Behind Recent Iranian Attack on Basrah Areas"]

[Text] AKHIR SA'AH lived on the Iraqi front lines of the battlefield. It went as far as a distance of no more than 500 meters from Iranian troop concentrations in the Kishk al-Basri area where recent battles took place. It stayed in the "Majnun" area long hours, witnessing fierce battles that are still going on.

This report from the Iraqi-Iranian front confirms that the decisive battle will begin this week since the only thing left for Iran to do is to risk another battle in the wake of its defeats in the "Hur al-Hawayzah" battles in an attempt to try what it has been unable to do for 43 long months.

Iraqi reports confirm that the Israelis were behind the recent attack, in planning and preparation, and that the arms air lift from Israeli airports to Tehran did not stop all throughout the battles and Iranian attacks on the Basrah area. The dimensions of the secret relationship between the Khomeyni regime and the Israeli government has already been brought to light, and there is more than one incident and piece of evidence attesting to the development of such a relationship. The question is to what extent?

Through my trip from the city of Basrah to the Kishk al-Basri area on the Iraqi-Iranian border, I became completely convinced that the decisive battle had not yet begun, although Iran had set the date for the 22nd of last February and had actually begun its operations that same day. However, the extent of the losses it suffered this time--which some sources estimated at about 50,000 killed and wounded--surprised the Iranian side. It had prepared well and had the help of Israeli military advisers in planning the recent attack that began at Hur al-Huwayzah, which the Israelis said resembled the Egyptian Bitter Lakes area, noting that it was from 80 to 90 kilometers long and 20-30 kilometers wide and is a good water barrier with water thick with weeds, bamboo and papyrus. It is the only link between Iraqi and Iranian territory and there are some villages alongside the two banks.

The Iranians resorted--as Maj Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, deputy commander-in-chief and Iraqi minister of defense, confirmed to AKHIR SA'AH--to committing new and



sizable elements to get a foothold on the "Mulaysan" road in order to get to the other major roads, taking advantage of the proximity of the lake sides to the highways, the Baghdad road particularly, where they are no more than 10 kilometers away in some places. Therefore, the Iranians committed four infantry divisions, armed with light and medium weapons, to face only the East Tigris forces. To guarantee the success of the first infiltration plan, many forces were committed to deployment in some areas.

That was not all. They attacked the front's central areas to confuse and disrupt the Iraqi forces' precautionary measures, aided by the size of the concentrations which some sources estimated at about half a million Iranian troops from the Khomeyni Guard and the regular army, in addition to the extension of the Iranian-Iraqi confrontation front.

Iranian failure in this attack was due to several reasons, including the lack of artillery and tank cover and the failure to secure the supply lines which made them a nice morsel for the Iraqis to savor. The Iraqis concentrated two full divisions to close in on them from all sides after closing off all access points the Iranians had used. They engaged these forces in areas that had fallen under Iranian control in the villages of al-Sakhras and al-Bayda where fierce battles using conventional weapons raged with the participation of the Iraqi popular army. Some of the Iranian troops had to surrender while others were either killed or wounded.

It is noted that the Iraqi troops undertook a courageous and well-planned step. They prepared a field command, entrusted with the task of destroying the Iranian troops in the Hur al-Huwayzah area, called the East Tigris Command under the command of Maj Gen Hisham Sabah Fakhri. This new command was formed in record time (12 hours) and was completely ready to execute its combat mission within only 7 hours.

Thus, the confrontation with the Iranians at Hur al-Huwayzah lasted only 48 hours, during which the Iranians conducted a propaganda war about capturing al-Qurnah and cutting off the Basrah-Baghdad road, then confirming later that only al-Basrah was captured!

When I raised this point with Maj Gen Mahir 'Abd-al-Rashid, commander of the Iraqi III Corps, he confirmed that "the information media are wrong to talk about the defense of al-Basrah when the battles are raging at far-away distances, amounting in some parts of 600 kilometers. Besides, we are not defending al-Basrah, they are defending the Iranian 'al-Mahmarah.' The fighting that occurred at 'Tamril' inside the Iranian borders underscores our point of view because they suffered over 20,000 killed and wounded."

U.S. military reports say Khomeyni massed about 350,000 to 400,000 Iranians, mostly young boys, at the front's southern sector to invade al-Basrah. Their consecutive human wave attacks were mowed down by Iraqi guns. Thousands of them were killed while thousands of others were captured. Iraqi shelling was so fierce and concentrated that observers called it "hell fire."

About the battles of the past 10 days, Maj Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, Iraqi minister of defense, noted that the Iranians resorted to deception when they attacked the fourth sector in al-Shayb area, in addition to another attack in the central area of the front a few days following the former attack. Their purpose was to cause confusion and disarray within the Iraqi military command to cover up the huge attack that started the night of last 22 February when they massed about half a million fighters, by their own admission.

But Iraqi means of observation were fully alert to the Iranian deception and we waited for the Iranian attack on the south Kishk al-Basri area forward of the area separating III and IV Corps. But the Iranian attack was over that same night due to the heavy losses they suffered.

The attack was repeated, however, in the same area to the north, particularly in the western half, which is covered with water due to the high water level, where the Iranians committed large numbers at night to form a bridgehead in the dark in an attempt to avoid Iraqi fire. The Iranians planned to extend the bridgehead to a crucial area at the Iraqi defensive positions, in addition to expanding the area of operations in the lakes area to cut off the al-Basrah-Muhaysan road and join up with other troops by land to surround the Third and Fourth Armies. The operation was called "Khaybar," which confirms the presence of Israelis behind this operation, despite the claims of the Iranian Islamic Command and its defense of the Palestinian cause.

Several recent reports have indicated that daily arms shipments are sent from a southern Israeli airport to Tehran where arms shipments of mines, hand grenades and "Lance" rockets have amounted to \$135 million, but Israeli-Iranian cooperation does not end there. Information has confirmed that cooperation armaments began with an Israeli civilian and military mission that flew to Tehran 3 days after the Iraq-Iran war broke out to help out the Iranian staff, some of whose commanders maintain close ties with the Israeli intelligence service, "Mosad."

This is in addition to Israeli arms shipments that arrived in Tehran from Tel Aviv via European brokers. Most of the deal was for 106 mm guns and ammunition, tires for the F-4 aircraft, of which Iran owns a large number, and engines for the "Scorpion" tanks and also the M-60 tank.

The biggest scandal that irrefutably exposed the existence of close relations between Israel and the Tehran rulers was the crash of a Canadair CL-44 transport plane on its third flight from Tel Aviv to Tehran carrying arms, ammunition, American spare parts and other things from Israel to Iran. The aircraft used to land at Larnaca airport in Cyprus before proceeding to Tehran.

Former Iranian President Abel Hasan Bani Sadr did not deny this information. He confirmed that the Israelis are selling arms and equipment to Iran and that he was very much opposed to dealing with Israel, a position he expressed in cabinet meetings where he pointed out that Iran should make peace with Iraq.

To go back to the recent conflict, we reaffirm that the east with which recent Iranian aggressions against Iraq were faced is due to Iranian offensive tactics which have not changed since the outbreak of the war and are based on the following:

- Utilizing the attacker's advantage in exploiting the initial shock, thus robbing Iraqi defenses of the chance to react quickly while reinforcing the attack to achieve further objectives.

- Keeping the Third and Fourth Armies busy with successive attacks and attempting to isolate them to achieve any victory in any corps which would have an effect on Iraqi morale.

- Sustained simultaneous heavy attacks on the front of several units and formations at close intervals to prevent any kind of cooperation between units.

- Reliance on the Khomeyni Guard and regular army infantry backed by successive waves of artillery and armored vehicles in an attempt to take advantage of the terrain and the natural barriers.

Thus, several military sources confirm that Iran's military collapse is the alternative being put forth for ending the war in view of Iran's many defeats, while the wager to prolong the war in order to wear our Iraq has been dropped. Nonetheless, this does not preclude another imminent Iranian offensive in an attempt by the Iranian command to compensate for prior losses so as to offer the Iranian people, who are increasingly supporting peace with Iraq, some victories, albeit imaginary.

This is what a quick visit to the Iraqi front confirms. The strength of Iraqi preparations was made evident by the increasing numbers of Eastern-made tanks, anti-aircraft artillery units and air defense units. Iraqi forces recently received French 155 mm heavy artillery that can deal with any Iranian concentrations.

Another reason for the belief that the next battle may be this week is the feeling of a stranglehold that has come over the Iranians as a result of the Iraqi siege of Khark Island where fierce naval battles are raging, the most recent of which was the Iraqi attack on a convoy transporting fuel for Iranian aircraft under the protection of two warships. Iranian forces tried but the Iraqi forces hit the rescue ship, destroying 80 percent of the convoy. Iraq hit about 150 ships of various sizes. Lloyds [of London] Insurance Company has acknowledged the sinking of 55 ships. The other ships are either owned or leased by Iran and carry no insurance. These hits have affected oil exports because Iraq has designated a war zone, declaring through its minister of defense that it will hit any ship within Iraqi range of fire spotted by Iraqi observation means.

#### Khark Island Siege

Khark Island is one of the largest oil export ports in the Middle East. It represents the most important oil resource for Iran inasmuch as it exports 95

percent of its crude oil and 65 percent of its petroleum by-products, hence the name "the Iranian artery" given it by the shah. Iran, moreover, imports through this port most of its foodstuffs, consumer goods and industrial and even military requirements.

Khark is located at a distance of 160 kilometers from the Gulf and is connected to the pipelines coming from various Iranian cities. It also links Iranian oil installations, be they the ones located on it or those fed from the mainland. The most important of the pipelines are the Pazan pipeline which is 122 kilometers long; the Agha Jari, 640 kilometers long; the Marun, 123 kilometers long; the Kaj Saran, 568 kilometers and al-Ahvaz, 135 kilometers.

The island is supplied by a huge chemical project located on the island itself and connected to oil refineries on the Iranian mainland. Iraq has attacked it several times and it is now inoperative. There are eight areas for loading crude oil and a number of oil tanks with a capacity of 80 million barrels.

Military sources at the highest level confirmed to AKHIR SA'AH that Iraq will indeed destroy Khark Island, should it deem it necessary to deprive Iran of its resources just as Iraq has been deprived of exporting its oil across the Gulf. Iraq had been keen on preserving the freedom of navigation in the Gulf in appreciation of the fact that energy sources in the Gulf not only belong to Iraq and Iran, but are also the economic and civilization life line for many European and South Asian countries, Japan particularly, which are totally dependent on Gulf oil. But Syria's action in severing Iraq's oil pipeline passing through its territory, plus Iran's rejection of the Iraqi proposal to allow normal navigation in the Gulf, submitted 8 months ago, have rendered Iraq's option of doing nothing in the face of Iran's full enjoyment of its oil resources very slim. Therefore, Iraq will hit ships within Iraqi firing range to prevent Iran from exporting oil as a new pressure card against Iran and a warning to other countries of the world about the perils of a prolonged war.

The important question remains: Who will win this long war that has entered the realm of futility and absurdity?

12502

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## TAHA RAMADAN DECLARES INTENT TO FIGHT 10 MORE YEARS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3103, 30 Mar 84 pp 24-26

[Interview with Taha Yasin Ramadan, first deputy prime minister and general commander of the Iraqi Popular Army, by Sana' Sa'id: "Iraq Getting Ready for War for Another 10 Years If Necessary"; date and place not specified]

[Text] AL-MUSAWWAR had a comprehensive interview with Taha Yasin Ramadan, first deputy prime minister, member of the RCC and general commander of the Iraqi Popular Army, about the Iraq-Iran war. He said; "Iraq is preparing itself for war, even if it should last 10 more years!" He confirmed that the two super powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, want the war to go on to serve their strategies. He said his visit to Moscow next April is a positive step in Soviet-Iraqi relations; Iraq does not want arms from America, but wants it and its allies to refrain from supplying Iran with weapons. He said that Syria and Libya are playing the role of middlemen in arms deals, delivering them in full to Iran. About Majnun Island, the first deputy prime minister reaffirmed that Iraq wanted it to be a daily death trap for the Iranian forces, hence its delay in terminating Iranian operations there. He said, "We are grateful for Egypt's position towards us; it is a good and clear position." He also said, "Iraq is more ready than anyone else to implement the Geneva resolutions if Iran agrees."

At the beginning of the interview, AL-MUSAWWAR asked Mr Taha Yasin:

"Official statements in Iran still confirm and reassure other Gulf countries that Iran does not harbor any enmity toward them and will not attack any of them. What is your outlook regarding Iranian intentions?"

[Answer] Our assessment of the statements and intentions of the Iranian rulers after 4 years of war does not require much analysis and corroboration in order to determine their true intentions. Their practices and statements on more than one occasion through their most senior officials told us what their intentions are toward Iraq and toward the Gulf countries primarily, and even their intentions within the Islamic countries as a whole toward exporting the revolution or the theocratic rule represented by Khomeyni. Hereof, we should have realized that timely statements made at certain times by an Iranian official do not alter this picture. Moreover, Iran during its war with us has pursued actions against other Gulf states, including the conspiracy in Kuwait and the plot that surfaced in Bahrain aimed at overthrowing the system of rule there;



also the incident in Qatar, although it was not announced in detail. These are the indicators of their intentions in the area. Besides, we are aware of their contacts in Islamic countries and even Muslim communities in non-Islamic countries. Hence, Iranian statements toward Gulf states at this time to prove good intentions are no more than a tactical operation, as indicated by their allegations when the Iraqi army was inside Iran, that all they wanted was Iraqi withdrawal to international borders. But when Iraq did withdraw to international borders, the Iranians began declaring openly that they wanted to go into Iraq! Why? For what reason? Is not this clear proof of their bad intentions?

[Question] You are living with this battle. Can massive Iranian troops in east Basrah advance south to your borders with Kuwait to pose a threat to Arab Gulf states? And what would your position be?

[Answer] First of all, we consider the matter of Kuwait and Basrah as one. If Iran should occupy territory even in the direction of Kuwait--which would pose the most danger to the area and Arab territory--our confrontation with such an action will be at the same level and method without hesitation. In other words, we would not be mere spectators if Iranian troops tried to branch off in an attempt to cross our territory or go toward Kuwait.

[Question] But can Iraq bring the war to an end militarily at this time? In other words, from the human and economic point of view, especially since such an escalation is a political decision, not a tactical one?

[Answer] In principle, we will not allow this war to turn into a war of attrition and we will not allow it to be, as it has been called internationally, the forgotten war. We reject such a consequence. Accordingly, escalation is one aspect we are undertaking--that is why we are following the situation and their troop concentrations. We go into Iranian territory daily with aircraft and other weapons and inflict on them heavy losses. We are working in two parallel directions: the first is our support for any peace initiative, regardless of our power, because we have no ambitions, public or secret, inside Iran. But at the same time, we do not and will not allow any concessions regarding our rights, regardless of any consequences. Abandoning our rights, in anticipation of a subsequent stage is not found in our dictionary. Therefore, we are preparing ourselves for war, even if it were to go on 10 more years.

[Question] What is the possibility of intervention by the two giants in the area? In your view, who holds the cards and, accordingly, who today can preserve the security of the Gulf area, particularly since the Gulf states have refused to entrust the great powers with this task?

[Answer] According to international practice, any security for an area in the world is basically the responsibility of the indigenous population. But unfortunately, and due to Arab weakness and decline, there is indirect allusion to a foreign umbrella and its role with regard to the security aspect. It is regrettable that such a thing exists in the Arab area. As for the position of the two giants, it has never been that of a spectator, but one that wishes to reap benefits from the continuation and outcome of the war, each within its

own strategic outlook. Each of them believes that the continuation of the war will yield results that will ultimately serve their strategy, and each has its own special interests, circumstances and considerations, a situation that still holds true. Despite many developments, political in particular, within Iran as well as Iraq, whom the great powers did not expect to stand fast in the battle, they believed that Iraq's defeat was the most likely possibility, thus basing their calculations on that so to benefit from such an outcome. But political development occurred inside Iran and Iraq emerged as a power. Therefore, the picture is different as far as the two giants are concerned, but has not reached the degree of sufficient serious interest to end the war.

[Question] Will each of them employ some kind of maneuver to gain mastery over the area's security in order to satisfy its interests?

[Answer] Yes, each of them wants that. The principle of benefitting from the present circumstances is not over yet. However, the USSR is certainly farther from the area than the U.S. This is bound to lead to an imbalance between the two powers. I do not mean to say that I wish for both the Americans and the Soviets to come to the area together. But reality confirms that a total American presence in the area is unnatural and violates future prospects for the Arabs and the area, particularly if we wish to maintain the balance in the area.

Therefore, we believe that dealing with new changes in the area must be within this outlook. A balance of presence offers better guarantees for the future than the presence of only one side, especially for complete freedom.

#### Soviet Weapons and Iraq

[Question] Although the Soviets are supplying Iraq with arms, relations with Moscow have **never** been free of tension. How true is the allegation that deep down you feel a sense of disappointment over Soviet weapons and the absence of greater Soviet support?

[Answer] With regard to the Soviet Union, there is a difference in its positions since the beginning of the war up until now. During the 1st year of the war, they cut off everything, that is, contracts signed prior to the war because there were no new contracts then. I think this was within the outlook I have already mentioned that the two giants wanted to profit as much as possible from the war's outcome. However, a relative development emerged thereafter. In 1982, things changed somewhat and we can now say that as a result of the political change within Iran and the sound Iraqi position, that chose not to join one bloc or another, preferring to adhere to its independence despite the difficult and delicate phase, there is a clear change in the USSR's position, be it in its general stance on information regarding the war or in its assessment of the rule in Iran. In 1981, it was not apt to call Iranian rule dubious or reactionary because it regarded it as a revolution. Today, it is a different story, as reflected in all Soviet statements and press reports through their officials and military aid as well. Therefore, I may visit Moscow next month as a positive step in relations between the two countries regarding weapons and everything.

[Question] Through your contacts with the U.S., has it been established that it is impossible to get arms from there. And, is this in keeping with the allegation that the U.S. had an interest in attaining a balance of power in the Gulf and in not tripping the balance by an Iraqi defeat?

[Answer] Right now we do not want the U.S. to give us weapons. We want it and its allies to stop supplying Iran with arms.

[Question] You often talk about certain countries supplying Iran with weapons. Can you name them?

[Answer] Israel, Britain, North Korea, Spain and the Scandinavian countries, in addition to black-market companies and dealers who deal in large volume. This is in addition to the middleman represented by Syria and Libya who purchase weapons in their names for delivery to Iran. An example is the huge deal for Spanish arms and ammunition that was ostensibly for Syria, but was diverted to Iran. This came to light when we went to Spain to protest and they showed us documents signed by the Syrian minister of defense. The deal included a 106 mm anti-tank gun which is a Western weapon that does not figure in the Syrian army's armaments. It was painful that a middleman facilitated the sale of arms to be diverted to a third party, Iran.

[Question] Will the containment of the war persist in the current manner or are we not safe from unexpected new developments? And who holds the rein of decisive settlement in this regard?

[Answer] It is natural that the Iraq-Iran war be influenced directly by the circumstances of each of the two countries. On the other hand, any political development in the Arab arena in the first place and the international arena in the second place will have an effect in shortening or prolonging the war. First, there are the capability, power and will of each of the warring parties. When there is a will by both sides to stop the fighting in a balanced way, the weapons will be silenced 90 percent, and there will be no need for the Arabs and the international scene to stop the war. But if such a will is immature with regard to the two warring parties, the influence of the Arabs and the international scene will be substantive. A development in the Arab political scene, such as a position of solidarity with Iraq, would have a significant positive reaction with regard to shortening the war and on the form the negotiations would assume. The importance I place here on the Arab position does not stem from my optimism that there certainly will be something, even along the lines of the Arab foreign ministers' conference held in Baghdad earlier this month, which represents a political position we consider distinctive from any other political position in the past stage; that is, the comparison here is with the former deteriorating situation.

[Question] But many Arab countries desire neutrality.

[Answer] If the Arab position is to undergo a 100 percent turnaround, to a neutral position in the war, the power will turn more in Iraq's direction. But, if it becomes partial, it would be another story. You know that there are two Arab countries, officially, backing Iran with all their economic and



geographic capabilities. Syria could have been neutral, not on Iraq's side but at the same time not severing the Iraqi oil pipeline going through its territory. Oil has nothing to do with supporting Iraq. The pipeline was put into operation in accordance with an agreement. Oil pipelines usually stay in operation even between two warring countries. Cutting off the Iraqi pipeline going through Syrian territory confirms Syria's stand on Iran's side in the fighting. Therefore, if we obtain true neutrality of all Arabs, things will be different. Any political development in the Arab arena is desirable; therefore, when we look at the Arab foreign ministers' conference, we do not do so from a rhetorical point of view, but rather on the basis that it can be a step towards better serious and practical positions.

[Question] Where does Egypt stand on all this?

[Answer] We are grateful to Egypt's position given its circumstances, which we appreciate, and given the Arab situation as a whole. Egypt's own domestic position is improving on all fronts. We consider Egypt's position, not just the political stance, a good position as far as Iraq and the war with Iran are concerned. Egypt, specifically under President Mubarak's rule, has adopted a clear and unambiguous stance, especially with respect to the Iran-Iraq war. Mubarak's and the Egyptian government's position towards the assessment of the dangers of the ongoing war was made clear by the fact that Egypt has a role in the political initiatives that sometimes take place with Iraqi coordination with a view to changing and developing the political situation in Iraq's favor in the ongoing war. Add to that other fields that fall within Egypt's capabilities and circumstances.

All we wish for is a change in Egypt so that it can assume its national role in the Arab arena, and to succeed together in providing the necessary circumstances to realize this great goal. We view this as an extension to ending the war between Iraq and Iran.

[Question] What is the present status concerning the situation on Majnun Island which is claimed to be of no strategic significance to you?

[Answer] What gave importance to this subject was Iranian mass media. From the strategic point of view, we do not like to exaggerate, but I emphasize that every inch of Iraqi soil is dear to us. But we are still at war, and war has its special techniques and requirements. Sometimes, a few kilometers' retreat can serve the fighting and the military effort to inflict the heaviest possible losses, and may be better than being on the same line. No every pull-back on our part or advance on their part means a defeat for us and a victory for them. Regarding Majnun, it is an island surrounded by water on three sides, while on the fourth side are Iraqi troop concentrations. The island is not a dry one, but a swamp. Any sensible army in the world, when it wants to fight a country and hold on to territory, chooses defensible land as a secure advance base. As for Majnun, which the Iranians have chosen, they cannot defend it, nor can they spread out from it. Thus, it poses no threat to us, and consequently, is no good to them as a staging area for expansion or advance.

[Question] But why don't you bring this matter to an end and regain the whole of Majnun Island?

[Answer] We could have done that on the 2nd day of their offensive, but we put it off. This move was part of our calculations of the fighting along the front where Iran is concentrating its troops. We want Majnun to be a daily death trap for Iranian troops, besides the fact that troop concentrations in this place will be at the expense of other more important and strategic locations. This does not mean it is a final decision. We may suddenly decide to end the Majnun affair, but I assure you that the Iranian presence on part of it does not mean we are unable or incapable of reclaiming it.

[Question] How long can the Iraqi economy hold up against an enemy whose national product is 4 times that of Iraq?

[Answer] I can speak very accurately because I am directly involved with the Iraqi economy. We have been very scrupulous with our people in this sensitive area. One and a half years ago, we told them we were going through some harsh financial times, which was totally expected. Many financial experts were surprised that we went that long before experiencing economic disorder. The longer-than-usual war and Syria's 1983 decision to sever the pipelines through its territory, which constitute 60 percent of Iraq's exports, played a role in weakening the economy. Iraq stood fast, contrary to Syrian and Iranian expectations that Iraq would be finished militarily within 2 or 3 months of the war. They made classic calculations based on the volume of imports and exports, and this is no secret, and saw that Iraq would not be able to hold up economically for more than 3 months, especially since 50 percent of the total [oil exports], the Gulf line, stopped the first day of the war. Nonetheless, we faced these difficulties calmly and patiently. We tried to program domestic and external measures. The basis was how the citizens could bear the burden gradually without affecting their morale, while maintaining the rate of growth we have achieved through sweat and blood. At the same time, we took the future into account should the war continue.

Today, one and a half years after the measures were adopted, I say that we have overcome the worst of times through continued development projects in agreement with all companies. We adopted internal rationing measures in keeping with the people's circumstances and still have other measures which we are not eager to enforce just yet. We initiated studies and activities that tend to expand the Iraqi economy's horizons for an upcoming phase: building oil pipelines and new refineries projects.

[Question] What about the projects for opening new oil export outlets through Turkey, Saudi Arabia and al-'Aqabah to international markets? Have you prepared the ground for Western help such as the U.S., Britain and France?

[Answer] Oil projects do not need to win the support of the U.S. or Britain. They are clear economic projects in which all companies would like to participate because it is to their advantage.

[Question] What about your debts to France? Have you been able to arrange for new loans to finance them?

[Answer] We have problems with France. Everything has been settled in accordance with specific programs. During my recent visit, we reached an agreement on all points. The fact is we consider Iraqi-French and Arab-French relations important and vital. The Arabs, not only Iraq, must develop their relations with France, which represents a weight in Western Europe as a special power. We do not want Western Europe, as a power with special interests, to follow the U.S. or any other party; developing and expanding relations with France will lead to just that because it is a key element in the European community. At the same time, relations with the other sides must also be strengthened. It has proven as a nation that France looks out for its interests and gives special consideration to its relations with others. We consider France's stand on our side in the war's darkest movements--compared to other countries' positions in particular--an honorable one that has deepened our conviction to strengthen and develop our relations with it. I think Egypt is aware of that and is working towards that end. During my recent visit to France, we discovered that the situation and the political relationship between us is assuming a new dimension and another depth, despite allegations by some countries, including the U.S. and Britain, who tried to belittle and upset this relationship.

A year ago, we were facing difficulties in arranging economic and financial formulas between us and France. This year, however, we needed only one visit to settle everything. This proves that the points of agreement and confidence in Iraq's economic future are more clear to the French.

[Question] The 1925 Geneva Protocol, while banning the use of chemical weapons, did not ban their production. The question is: If Iraq did not use these weapons, does it at least produce them?

[Answer] In practice, I am not able to say whether or not this kind or any other kind of [chemical] weapons are being produced. At the same time, Iraq has the right to have anything that tends to guarantee its power and capabilities. This is one thing. The other thing is that we are extremely surprised at the U.S. and at all countries who look at the Geneva resolutions and conventions through the use of weapons only. We all know that the Geneva resolutions stipulate the good treatment of prisoners, and, up till now, we do not know the names of our prisoners because Iran has refused to provide us with them. We know that the Geneva conventions call for non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Accordingly, the Geneva resolutions and other conventions must be taken as a whole. Therefore, I say, and this is not in defense of the fact we did not use this kind of weapon--because we do not need to defend ourselves in this regard--Iraq is more ready than anyone else to implement the Geneva resolutions if the other side agrees, provided that they are taken as a whole, not as a part.

[Question] Did the Soviet Union supply you with yellow rain?

[Answer] No, absolutely not. This did not happen.

[Question] Why then did the U.S. attack you, giving the impression that you actually did use this weapon?

[Answer] Its position is strange. The U.S., that condemns positions that did not occur on the Iraqi front, is the one that provided Israel with cluster bombs. This expresses its true state of affairs. For 3 years we have been asking for a list of prisoners through the UN, the Red Cross and other countries, but have not heard anything yet. We have not heard even an official condemnation of this similar to that of the chemical weapons' charges which were based on a report by one or two ambassadors to Iraq, although it has been confirmed that we did not use them at all.

[Question] We visited the Kashat factory and confirmed through the advisors working there that it is a phosphate factory and has nothing to do with chemical substances.

[Answer] I put off the factory project when I was minister of industry. It is a Ministry of Industry project which [one word missing] of the specific companies and whose production and purposes are known.

[Question] There are strong defensive fortifications around Kashat. It has been said they are in reaction to your fears of a possible attack, especially since it is located close to Syrian borders and Iranian aircraft may carry out a raid from there.

[Answer] We do not discount this because the climate publicized in Israel and the Knesset was similar to that talked about before the raid on the nuclear reactor. Therefore, we considered any charges that this area produces chemical substances, or even materials related to nuclear matters, a very clear cover for a possible attack on the factory. It is customary for Israel to put forth pretexts in advance to pave the way for a crime.

Therefore, our expectations do not stem from our imagination. Israel may do this if Iran is unable to hit it from Syrian territory. The al-Warid airport was hit by Iranian aircraft across Syrian territory, despite Syrian denials in the first 3 days [following the attack]. Fortunately, however, an Iranian pilot shot down in the Khanaqin area was in one of the raiding aircraft and spoke on Iraqi TV at the time. Likewise, when Iran failed to hit the nuclear reactor after losing dozens of aircraft in the attempt, Israel carried out this mission. Therefore, we do not discount a raid on this vital project. Accordingly, we are taking the existing extra precautions which you saw.

[Question] How far have your negotiations gone with the [Kurdish] Jalal al-Talabani group that threatened to resume the fight should negotiations fail?

[Answer] We do take a group of saboteurs in the north seriously at this stage. Although our enemies, Syria and Libya in particular in coordination with Iran, imagined that they could weaken our effort on the front, this did not happen because we did not commit units and were able to face the situation by using the popular army in the area. Therefore, the attrition they hoped for did not materialize.

This notwithstanding, whenever circumstances to close any gap present themselves, we will not hesitate to stop the hemeorrhage from this or that side. Thus, discussions between competent officials and the Jalal al-Talabani group are proceeding within this framework, but without preconditions or prejudice. The important thing is to stop this hemorrhage, no matter how mild, which we thought we had overcome after 4 years of war. As for the threat that should negotiations fail the fight would resume, I say it had been resumed; it is nothing new. I say, however, if this is one of its [the al-Talabani group] ideas, it is rejected and unacceptable. Negotiations in matters that guarantee the people's and the country's security is the direction that governs the attainment of any agreement; anything less is not permissible. Iran wants to undermine this country's unit, something that we do not and will not permit.

[Question] An agreement between you and the Kurds was supposed to have been signed early last January, but it was said that it faced some obstacles.

[Answer] There has not been an agreement, only speculation. It was only a cease-fire agreement at the time on the condition that negotiations would continue.

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## SECULAR, SHARI'AH SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT COMPARED

### Secularism Guarantees Democracy

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 25 Mar 84 p 10

[Article by Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar: "Guarantee of Democracy Lies in Secularism"]

[Text] It is indisputable that there is no separation between religion and secular affairs in Islam. It is also indisputable that this system of government was completely suitable for the era of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and of his pious companions. But where are we now from that era?

The problem we are facing today lies in the contradiction between the modern democratic systems and traditions which we adopt at present and the nature of the Islamic system and shari'ah which prevailed at the time of the venerable prophet. The most obvious example we can cite here is the principle of the separation of powers. Because the Islamic system of government does not separate religious and secular affairs, we find that managing the country's policy and running the people's affairs was totally entrusted to an absolute ruler, often the caliph. In the modern democratic societies, all affairs are managed in accordance with the principle of the "separation of powers."

In the conventional democratic traditions, we find that the principle of separation of powers is very important. The duties of the legislative authority--the parliament--are separated from those of the executive authority--the cabinet. The same applies to the judicial authority or to the supreme constitutional court which has clear and specific duties. Even though this principle of the separation of powers does not mean the severance of all links between these government institutions or agencies, the principle itself seeks fundamentally to insure the progress of democracy on a sound path and insure that the ruler or the cabinet does not violate its duties and that officials and politicians do not misuse their positions. Thus, the objective of the principle of the separation of powers in modern political systems is to insure that the legislative authority represents the people, that the executive authority implements the legislation approved by the legislative authority and that the cabinet is accountable to the parliament and that its members are brought to account according to their actions. What is more important is that the supreme constitutional court in the countries that have made a long stride on the path of the

democratic experience is empowered to bring the head of state himself to account and to try, dismiss or punish him in accordance with the so-called principle of impeachment if he misbehaves badly.

This, generally, is a brief summary and a general picture of the principle of the separation of powers adopted by the modern democratic countries in our present age. The question that raises itself here is: Can such a principle be realized in a society which emphasizes literal adherence to the Islamic shari'ah and insists on establishing a traditional Islamic political system? The answer is, I believe, negative because Islam does not, basically, separate religious affair from secular affairs.

Yes, it is true that the position of minister was introduced in the era of the Muslim caliphs who came after the era of God's noble prophet and that the caliph did consult with men of opinion at times. But we must know that all this did not prevent the abuse of authority by people in power and did not prevent the ruler from acting despotically, abusing his position or harming his people's conditions without the presence of any higher official authority to bring him to account or at least to watch his behavior and to curtail his excesses. The fate of ulema, intellectuals, men of letters, poets and even clergymen depended on the disposition of the sultan. What did Ibn Taymiyah do to deserve to be jailed, terrorized and tortured? What did Ahmad ibn Hanbal do, other than disagree with Caliph al-Ma'mun in opinion on the issue of "creation of the Koran," to deserve to be jailed? As for the tribulation of physician and philosopher Avicenna, it is too well-known to be mentioned. What did Avicenna do to deserve to have his home destroyed and to be jailed by the troops [military] other than the fact that the military were jealous of him, keeping in mind that Avicenna was the physician and minister of [caliph] Shams-al-Dawlah?

Thus, what is important is that if the policy of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, was ideal in managing the affairs of the Muslims and non-Muslims, the conduct of many caliphs in the Umayyad Abbasid and Ottoman eras was very remote from that of God's noble prophet. The character and qualities of those caliphs were different from, even contrasting with, those of the noble prophet and of his pious companions. It can be said here that God's will is operative and His wisdom evident in the strength and justice of Islam in the era of Prophet Muhammad, may God's peace and prayers be upon him. The practical and objective circumstances and the duty of conveying the message for which God chose his noble prophet dictated at the time that all the political, legislative, executive and judicial powers be entrusted to a single individual, namely God's prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him. It is no secret to the Muslim that God's noble prophet, fortified with God's wisdom and with His Koran, did not confine his statements or issue his sentences and establish God's restrictions in accordance with the Koran alone and that the prophet consulted with his companions on numerous issues concerning the affairs of the Muslims. The prophet balanced the various opinions according to the situation whenever new developments cropped up.

But what is our situation, as Muslims, today? The most brilliant and greatest Islamic era was the era of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him. But that era's idealism has ended and there is no prophet among us now to rule justly and his pious companions are not this era's men. It is true that we

have God's Koran and that the noble prophet's Sunna is the best example to follow. But as I believe that the conditions were suitable and God's wisdom evident in making the Islamic state a just, strong and ideal state in the era of God's prophet, I also believe that establishing justice among people nowadays, securing their rights and safeguarding the rights of all individuals and citizens can only be achieved through the principle of the separation of powers which I have already explained.

Democracy has no meaning nowadays except through the separation of powers. There can be no dignity and no support protecting man's rights, freedom and life without adoption of some of the secular principles embraced nowadays by a number of advanced countries.

The difference between the model of government in Islam and the model of government in the secular and democratic countries is completely evident. There is absolute "centralism" in the Islamic model of government whereas "decentralism" is in the modern democratic model of government. There is a combining of authorities in the hands of a single absolute individual in the Islamic model of government whereas there is a separation of powers in the modern democratic systems of government whereas there is a separation of powers in the modern democratic systems of government. There is election, people's representation and accountability of officials in the democratic system of government whereas despotism and no accountability [in the Islamic system], even if we assume that the head of a state in Islam is "elected."

#### Adaptability of Shari'ah

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 4 Apr 84 p 8

[Article by Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar: "Between Secularism and Shari'ah: Suitability of Shari'ah for Every Time and Place: Role of Objective Conditions and Compatibility of Decisions With Reason"]

[Text] Dialogue within the bounds of reason and adherence to objectivity are acceptable to and commendable by many, even if the arguments cited by some people are weak or constitute absolutely no argument. But all this is one thing and abuse is another. Abuse, vituperation or even submitting to the heat of emotion are rejected within the framework of fruitful dialogue for the following reasons:

This latter form of writing, discussion, thinking or conduct will never provide an argument supporting an issue over which a debate is centered, assuming that we [can] ultimately emerge with a positive result.

He who lacks a convincing, or even a weak, argument is the one who resorts to abuse and vituperation to make up for the lack of argument. Abuse itself is more of a condemnation of the abuser than an argument with which he fortifies his position against the other side.

If abuse, vituperation and revilement are rejected by every human being, then they are more strongly rejected and objectionable when employed by a clergyman who claims to be defending religion and who declares his adherence to the "ethics" and the "principles" advocated by religion itself.



These, generally, are the broad lines to which we must adhere ethically in our dialogue over the shari'ah or in projecting our views concerning the concept of secularism. Let us, according to these broad lines, start with confining the discussion to the dictates of shari'ah that define dealings between individuals in society and settle whatever disputes develop among them. The view I hold is that article two of the constitution, in its capacity as the instrument regulating and organizing civil relations among individuals, is fit in its existing form to deal with many of the problems and issues that develop on the stage of events. This article, i.e. the current article two, adopts the rulings of the Islamic shari'ah when it finds in them proper solutions for specific problems pertaining to dealings and disputes among individuals. This same article two also permits the adoption of other positive legislative sources when it finds that such sources offer proper solutions to specific problems. Thus, there is no objection, contrary to what some people imagine, to application of the Islamic shari'ah when it offers proper rulings for certain problems. The objection focuses fundamentally on adoption of the shari'ah as the only main source of legislation because I do not imagine that the Islamic shari'ah can cover every big and small detail in dealings and relations among individuals in society for all time.

Somebody may object here by saying that the Islamic shari'ah is fit for every time and place. However, we must take this statement or objection as something that signifies the ability of the shari'ah to develop and grow on the one hand and its acceptance of decisions based on logic and reason when there are no clear provisions in the Koran or in the venerable Sunna on the other hand. But why don't we cite here some examples from our Islamic heritage so that the idea may become clearer to the mind and so that we may realize that the statement concerning the suitability of the shari'ah for every time and place cannot apply unless the decisions we make take into consideration all the objective circumstances on the one hand and the compatibility of the decisions with the logic of reason on the other hand.

When the Koran prohibited drinking alcohol, for example, we find that the relevant verses of the Koran were revealed in careful succession, taking into consideration the circumstances of time and place and all the objective givens that dictated that drinking be prohibited gradually. This is one precedent we find in the venerable Koran. The second precedent is embodied in a wise call urging a certain generation of people to get their offspring accustomed to new customs and concepts different to a large or small degree from the forefathers' customs and traditions "because they are born in a time different from yours." The third precedent that can be noted and from which guidance can be gained is embodied in 'Umar ibn al-Khattab's suspension of the legal punishment established for theft in the year of al-Ramadah in which the peninsula was afflicted with a severe drought. When the rains did not come, the crops dwindled and poverty and starvation spread, some individuals resorted to stealing at times just to survive.

In the face of those hard circumstances in the year of al-Ramadah and of their consequences, 'Umar demonstrated his wisdom clearly by refraining from applying the legal punishment for a thief when a man's life or death depended on that theft. Similarly, the principles of interpretation and analogy emerged at a later time only because Muslim jurisprudents examined some forms of human relations and problems in their time and found that it was necessary to find solutions and to

regulate some issues for which the venerable Koran contained no clear provisions and the noble Sunna contained no confirmed Hadith. The gist of the idea here is that our Islamic heritage contains precedents that demonstrate clearly how the elements of time and place were taken into consideration when something new developed in the theater of events.

Somebody may perhaps say that as long as this is how things are, i.e. as long as new forms of relations and disputes emerge suddenly between individuals at all times, then it would be more appropriate to open the door of interpretation anew "for the ulema" so as to come up with solutions befitting all developments and problems. Here is where, I believe, the first of the problems we are about to discuss emerges. If the schools of jurisprudence are numerous in a single sect, then what do you think of the multitude of sects and schools in Islam, not to mention a similar, or even bigger, multitude among the followers of the other religions and sects with which our Kuwaiti society particularly abounds? In the light of this multiplicity, what path could the jurisprudent explore and what road should the interpreter follow? Let nobody think that by our casting aside, unfairly, all considerations concerning the followers of the other religions, we can overcome all the obstacles confronting our endeavor to open the door of interpretation and, consequently, to adopt the Islamic shari'ah as the sole main source of legislation. We must note here that interpretation is founded basically on using reason, balancing the options and examining all the circumstances and complexities engulfing an issue before we make a judgment or decide on a certain matter. But what if the religious legislator exerts his intellect and puts his mind to the task to find a ruling for a specific issue and then discovers that there is no better ruling than that produced by positive laws in other non-Islamic societies? Logically and rationally, are we permitted to abandon positive rulings befitting certain problems that occur in our Islamic societies on the pretext that these are positive rulings existing in non-Islamic societies to start with? Is it permissible logically and rationally to turn away from some reasonable positive rulings that completely befit some of our secular affairs? I say, is it permissible that we turn away from such rulings and fabricate on our own, and out of detestable pride or haughtiness, offhanded rulings or interpretations just so it may be said that they derive from the shari'ah or it may be said that we are faithful to Islam and to God's shari'ah?

Doing this, wouldn't we be like he who uses bow and arrow in his just war instead of using the grenade, the gun or the rifle on the pretext that the latter are manufactured by imperialist countries that do not embrace Islam?

Reason has never been a monopoly confined to one sect to the exclusion of others. As long as this is the case and as long as interpretation is founded on reason fundamentally, then there is nothing to prevent the presence of proper solutions to some problems, regardless of whether the solutions emerge among us or among other peoples which embrace positive laws. This, specifically, is why I object to amending article two of the Kuwaiti constitution--an amendment that seeks to make the Islamic shari'ah the sole main source of legislation. Reason does not condone tempermental solutions or offhanded interpretations on the pretext that we cannot find in the Koran, the Sunna or even in our minds better solutions or interpretations. No, reason does not condone the exclusion of proper and reasonable solutions on the pretext that such solutions are "innovations" by positive laws of peoples who do not follow Islam.

## Democratic Experience Lauded

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 7 Apr 84 p 17

[Article by Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar]

[Text] In last Wednesday's article, I tried to underline the futility of the demand to amend article two of the Kuwaiti constitution. In this article, I will try to underline a new dimension of the issue. Last Wednesday's article focused fundamentally on an aspect pertaining to the regulation of relations between individuals and to defining the rules governing these relations. Today's article will focus on lauding our constitution and our democratic experience. I would not discuss our political situation here if amendment of article two of the constitution did not have serious dimensions closely or remotely affecting our political system, our constitution and our democracy at present and in the future.

I would like first to emphasize my support for the principle of the distribution of powers between the parliament, the cabinet and the judiciary in our political system and in any other system aspiring to achieve progress in all spheres of life. I would also like to emphasize my opposition to every endeavor that fragments or any step that intensifies the disunity of the one homeland or of the common destiny, regardless of whether the endeavor emanates from goodwill or from the motive of "fanaticism" for religion or for sect.

Now, why do I cling to these two principles, namely the principle of the distribution of powers among the authorities on the one hand and the principle of rejecting fragmentation on the other hand? My answer is that I reject "theocracy," which is government or political system founded on religion, regardless of the nature of such a theocracy. The equation perhaps becomes clearer when we learn that there is no separation between religion and the secular in Islam, i.e. there is no barrier between politics and religion. Because I reject the system founded on religion, then this means, naturally, that I refuse to have our political system founded on religion because there is no separation of powers in the Islamic system of government and because, I believe, national unity is not strengthened by a system of government founded on religion.

Let us now review some of the tragedies reflected by Islamic and Arab political systems that are openly religious or secular in order that we may find out the arguments on which I base my opposition to the Islamic system of government on the one hand and my praise for our current democratic system on the other hand.

In Bangladesh, the government apparatus stands in the face of the popular organizations demanding civil rights and political freedom. In Pakistan, 72 persons have been executed without trial, according to a report issued recently by the Human Rights Commission. In Iran, a report by Amnesty International points out that 399 persons have been executed after hasty trials or no trials at all. (1) If we turn to the Arab countries, we will find something even more surprising. The lives of a large number of citizens were claimed as a victim of their protest against increased prices of essential foodstuffs. Shortly afterwards, the tragedy was repeated in another Arab country where 19 percent of the population lives in cities of tin shacks. (2) In Egypt and Sudan, we can see how the government agencies continue to be unable to solve the political and economic problems

sweeping these two Arab countries. President Husni Mubarak's recent statements about the intensifying crisis of the population explosion and about what a burden this explosion poses to the state and its economy confirm that the course of the Egyptian policy requires fundamental reforms and modifications. As for Sudan's accusation of Libya of bombing its territories, this is amazing, even in the wake of yesterday's announcement by President Ja'far Numayri about foiling a coup attempt in Sudan. As for the feuds between Syria and Iraq, they are as tragic as the Israeli enemy's occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights or as tragic as the terrible Iran-Iraq war. If we turn to King Husayn's statement in Jordan regarding the evasiveness and vacillation of U.S. Mideast policy, it becomes evident that the Arab countries that have relied on the credibility or illusion of the "U.S. fairness" have been "frustrated" and disappointed in the goodwill of the United States toward the just Arab causes. (3)

This is just a little out of a lot because it is certain that a comprehensive review of the drawbacks of the Arab and Islamic regimes' drawbacks and of their failures requires long pages that will lead us beyond the framework of this article.

Now, when I look at the bitter reality of the Arab and Islamic worlds with a scrutinizing eye and compare all this with the situation in Kuwait and with the guaranteed public liberties and political and economic rights that we enjoy--I say that when I examine all this with a scrutinizing eye, then fairness dictates that we laud our constitution and our distinctive democratic system. We here in Kuwait may not perhaps be God's happiest creatures on earth and there may be some shortcomings in our policy or some failure on the part of some officials in performing their duty, but it is certain that through the constitution and by preserving our distinctive democratic experience, we can correct the flaw. As they guarantee our political and civil rights, the constitution and the democratic system also guarantee setting matters aright whenever we stray from the right path.

Somebody may perhaps say here that the demand for reform, regardless of the sphere of reform, comes only because people become more aware of the gaps and of the failure of the agencies entrusted with managing and tending the people's affairs. Even though this is an argument, the numerous experiences and the poor situation of many of the Arab and Islamic societies motivate me to reject completely the foundation of government on the basis of Islam.

My rejection of the system of government founded on Islam relies on two bases: Insofar as principle is concerned, I reject the foundation of any form of government in our modern world on the basis of any religion or sect because the consequences, I believe, will be grave to any society that follows such a path. This is the first basis. The second basis on which my rejection is founded is that the real situation in many of our Arab and Islamic societies which sing the praises of Islam is worsening and deteriorating.

The constitutional and legal gains on which we rely nowadays in our Kuwaiti policy and in regulating the affairs of internal life motivate me to urge that we cling to what we are enjoying at present.



Say whatever you wish about this viewpoint. Still, it is a viewpoint that does not want our Kuwaiti society to suffer a setback and to move backward. As for those who claim that sound Islam is not in conflict with the principle of the separation of powers, the question that projects itself urgently here is: Why have the Islamic states been doomed to reach the worst situation? Is it reasonable, despite the multitude of Arab and Islamic regimes, that we cannot find among them a single regime that truly deserves to be lauded for implementing the Islamic system of government, or for claiming to apply this system when it is far from doing so?

This is why I stress adherence to our current constitution as it is and without any change and why I demand at the same time that the parliamentary experience be preserved. This will safeguard our freedom and rights and perhaps--who knows--even our lives. This is also why I oppose "religious radicalism" and [all forms of] radicalism to whose faults and tragedies the history of peoples attests. This is also why I have opposed and continue to oppose the endeavor to amend article two of the constitution because such amendment poses a danger to the constitution itself and to our very democratic experience for which numerous other societies envy us.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. Amnesty International Report: AL-WATAN, No 3250, Saturday, 10 March 1984.
2. AL-WATAN, No 3251, Sunday, 11 March 1984.
3. AL-WATAN, No 3259, Monday, 19 March 1984.
4. Account Bill, AL-Mujtama', No 665, Tuesday, 3 April 1984.

#### Secular Viewpoint Refuted

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 21 Apr 84 p 6

[Article by Dr Ahmad al-Baghdadi: "Yes, Many Aspects of Muslim's Life Are Subject to Shari'ah, not to Rational Explanation"]

[Text] It seems that there will be an endless series of articles on which is sounder to follow in the life of Muslims: the shari'ah or secularism. The series was started by Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar and the responses have come in succession, with a single thread linking them: the shari'ah, not secularism. It is also to be noted that Dr al-'Umar has not gained a single supporter for his theory which favors secularism over the shari'ah in modern life, except for what has been cited by Dr 'Abdallah al-Ghazali on the importance of using reason in legislation. Dr al-Ghazali has tried to demonstrate the importance of relying on reason in making legislation. This has nothing to do with the issue raised by Dr al-'Umar, who considers that Islam is no longer fit to manage and solve the problems created by modern life. The reason for this, as Dr al-'Umar sees it, is that the circumstances of the modern age dictate relying primarily on reason and not on Islamic opinions and sects that evoke more disagreement than



than agreement whereas it is confirmed that agreement comes into existence when reason is relied upon. Dr al-'Umar has not dared deny the Islamic shari'ah openly, claiming that the shari'ah is a part of the Muslim's life but that the current circumstances permit it to be a part of belief, but not of dealings.

To put it briefly, Dr al-'Umar raises a very old issue, namely the issue of which is more suitable to follow: Tradition--the letter of the shari'ah--or reason? He has dressed the issue in the robe of modernism and his articles have aroused the interest of many. To be honest, it has become evident that Dr al-'Umar knows nothing about the shari'ah policy, considering that his latest article which he has written in response to Dr Salim al-Bahnasawi demonstrates that he knows nothing about the venerable Koran or about the prophet's Sunna. This is regrettable, not only insofar as Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar is concerned but also insofar as many others who have their Ph.D.'s and who have never read a book on the shari'ah policy are concerned. This is why we find that their opinions and conclusions rely primarily on personal interpretation that is founded on no legal proof. This is one of the biggest mistakes in the discussion on the Islamic shari'ah and life.

Dr al-'Umar calls for appealing to reason, forgetting or disregarding that there are many aspects in the Muslim's life for which we can find no logical explanation founded on reason and which we must accept as they are, such as the system of inheritance, of cutting off a thief's hand, which is something that secularists do not accept because, to them, it is characterized by brutality and by being uncivilized, of whipping an unmarried adulterer and stoning a married adulterer. We cannot find a logical and rational explanation for any of the legal punishments established by the wise shari'ah and the Muslim is not entitled to demand a rational explanation for them because they come from God, may He be praised, and are not subject to debate. Rather, the Muslim is required to submit to them and accept them without argument. What is the rationale behind having the Muslim marry in a certain way, separate from his wife in a certain way or even be buried in a certain way defined by the prophet's noble Hadiths, not by human reason?

Let us turn to politics and government, a sphere where Dr al-'Umar believes that it is sounder and more appropriate to adopt secularism. Islam, as Dr al-'Umar believes, does not provide for the separation of powers, has no system to bring the ruler to account and lacks what is available in the political systems that adopt traditional democracy, such as the parliamentary system and the presidential system. Moreover, we do not find in Islam a certain system of government on which to rely in our modern life. The fact is that Dr al-'Umar does not know what the Islamic shari'ah contains insofar as the issue of politics and government is concerned. In the shari'ah, the head of the state has a position similar to that of the head of state in the modern presidential system. He is elected by the people--takes a pledge of allegiance [al-bi'ah]--and is in charge of the executive authority which he runs through his aides, assistants and advisers. He is accountable for every detail, big or small, in this regard. [In the shair'ah], there are also those who are engaged in legislation as a joint duty shared by the head of the state, the ulema and the experienced people with influence among the Muslims. There is also the judicial authority which is exercised by the judiciary in freedom from the sultan's power. The legislation and execution of these powers is subject to the rules and dictates established in the shari'ah

according to principles of jurisprudence known to the ulema only. As for the statement that the history of Islam does not provide the evidence of this [separation of powers] in practice, this statement does not discredit Islam but rather discredits the Muslim rulers who swerved from the path of the Islamic shari'ah, monopolized political power and then turned it into an inheritance bequeathed from father to son. This deviation is proof and testimony of the prophet's Hadith: "You will violate the bonds of Islam one by one, beginning with the bond of government and ending with the bond of prayer." The fault is in the Muslims, not in Islam. There is no place for the argument concerning the various Islamic sects and schools. Dr al-'Umar's question as to which sect should prevail is null and void because the difference between the sects is on the subsidiary issues, not on the constant principles. The argument concerning the multitude of sects is something right intended for a falsehood and something raised by the secularists like 'Uthman's shirt whenever they fail to fathom the depth of the Islamic shari'ah. Putting the shari'ah to the test and adopting it as a way of life in society, by both the rulers and the ruled, is something that requires sacrificing all the worldly pleasures into which the modern systems of government and the Muslims plunge right up to their ears. Plunging into the Islamic heritage to extract the rules and controls necessary for modern life is not something that can be done with the stroke of a pen or by merely getting a Ph.D., because this requires a determination rarely attained and an impartiality hard to achieve. Most present-day Muslims, led by those with higher education, fail to perform their prayer duties because prayers involve the trouble of ablution and of cleanliness. Even though prayers, which are the backbone of religion, take very little of their time, they neglect them. So what do you think they do when it comes to government and politics? Moreover, reliance on reason in the secular manner advocated by Dr al-'Umar is easy and may lead us to disintegration and to non-abidance because there will then be no prohibitions or restrictions. Whatever the mind deems fit will, by necessity, mean that it is fit for both the individual and society. When Western thinking decided that sexual abnormality comes under the category of personal freedom, the Western legislative authorities decided that this abnormality is permissible. When the Western philosophers decided that usury comes under the category of economic interest, the Western system approved it. By the same criterion, apply this to the adoption of religious creeds viewed by those who hold them as sound creeds whereas they are in fact otherwise, such as atheism and other human beliefs embraced under the pretext of the freedom of belief. Can we rely on this rational criterion which individuals subjugate to their whims because it meets their dissolute wishes and desires and covers their faults, not to mention the absence of any psychological costs, burdens and restrictions? This is something which the Islamic shari'ah does not offer mankind because the shari'ah contains religious provisions and costs that require clean, faithful and strong souls. As for the weak souls that want to get rid of these burdens and costs and to put them behind their backs, they use the pretext of modernization and rationalism to cover up their weakness and inability to carry the principles of the Islamic shari'ah.

As for the issue of democracy and the Islamic shari'ah, it is indubitable that there are many disputed points, such as the principle of the sovereignty of the nation which Islam does not acknowledge and the issue of the bases on which the parliamentary or presidential system is established. Where is the ruler's responsibility, as defined by the shari'ah, for every big and small detail?

Where is the Muslims' right to elect or select their president? Where is the freedom of the judiciary? Where is women's right to vote and where are numerous other things for which there is no space here to enumerate? Is Islam compelled to follow Western democracy in order to be, or to be considered, democratic? Are the Muslims doomed to be followers and dependents of the West in everything, even in matters of their world and of their activities? Have the nation's intellectuals tried to explore the principles that regulate the rules of government in accordance with the Islamic shari'ah and to put these principles to the test to prove their soundness or faultiness? I believe that it is fair to determine the results only after you give the test. As long as the live experience of applying the principles of the shari'ah was carried out successfully in the era of the orthodox caliphs and was then repeated successfully under Caliph 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and in the case of al-Khawarij, then there is nothing to prevent repeating it anew. But the fact is that the Muslims do not want it because it costs them sacrifices then cannot withstand. Moreover, the educational makeup of most of the educated and of people with college degrees is based on a secular foundation detached from any religious link with the Islamic shari'ah. So how are they expected to support the shari'ah in social life and in the political and economic situation?

Let those who agree do so and those who disagree do so. Islam is the fate of Muslims in this world and in the hereafter and their duty in this world. The future is for this religion, even if the current signs indicate otherwise. It is very regrettable that there emerge among the Muslims those who cast doubt on Islam and its political, economic and social law on the pretext that Islam does not meet the needs of this age. These few individuals have not even tried to read the shari'ah policy, as indicated by what they write. They want to present themselves to the people through the door [slogan] of "disagree and you will become known." This was achieved when their secular demand was fulfilled. They stopped at the responses and have not projected the alternatives. Let Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar tell us through a well-organized plan how secularism can be the basis of life and how he will convince people of this secularism, especially since the people read about the increase in crimes of murder, deviancy, rape, theft and addiction in the societies which have separated church from the state and have gotten so lost in the labyrinths of secularism that the voices of many of their citizens are rising nowadays for a return to religious life, for curtailing secularism, for introducing religious education to the schools and for the death penalty for murderers? Will Dr al-'Umar be kind enough and explain to us how secularism can be the basis of life and prove to us through the experiences of any other society that secularism has been able to achieve security, stability and political, economic and social justice? Only then will we accept his viewpoint. But for him to present his opinions just to cast doubt on Islam, this is a sick logic that is rejected on the whole and in detail. The only hope for Dr 'Abdallah al-'Umar and for those who agree with his opinion is guidance and God is true when He says: "This is my straight path, follow it and do not follow other paths that lead you away from it. This is what God has instructed, perhaps you may have His fear in your hearts."

NEW PHALANGE OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF JUBAYL INTERVIEWED

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 28 Apr 84 p 4

[Interview with new Phalangist chief of Jubayl, Engineer Kamal al-Qirdahi; date and place not specified]

[Text] The new head of the Phalangist region of Jubayl, Engineer Kamal al-Qirdahi, issued a call in an interview with the Lebanese News Agency yesterday for the citizens of Jubayl to avoid fanaticism, selfishness, and regressive thinking. He asked the party members to support and back the Lebanese cause. He said, "The region of Jubayl is trying to give complete support to the course of salvation and rallying around the legitimate authorities." He pointed out that the region "is using all its capabilities in order to strengthen the Lebanese resistance." He affirmed that one of his goals is to "halt offenses, preserve the dignity of the citizens, and deal with the economic and financial situations, which are suffering from some crises."

The Interview with al-Qirdahi

The following is the text of the interview with Engineer al-Qirdahi:

[Question] How do you view your party responsibility, now that you have assumed leadership of the region?

[Answer] In terms of party responsibility, I began my life as head of the Jubayl section of the Phalange in 1975. It owes its importance to the fact that it is the section located in the region's capital, which is the economic and administrative cornerstone of the district. I exercised responsibility in both the political struggle and the military struggle. In the Phalangist school, we learned how to bear national and party responsibility, with all that implies in terms of sacrifice and selfless, sincere devotion. Today, now that I have reached a higher level of party responsibility, as embodied in the leadership of the region of Jubayl, I am looking at the future with optimism and hope for success, both for the good of the country in general and the citizens of Jubayl in particular.

In these delicate circumstances, the head of a region bears great responsibility. He is responsible for numerous fields, the first of which is the party area. This consists of administering the region of Jubayl. It has 35 Phalangist



divisions spread through the villages and towns of the district. They form a rather large and active group of people numbering in the thousands. These Phalangists are struggling within a correct party structure. They are always a model of discipline, sincerity, and devotion. The region also has an executive committee that administers the affairs of numerous administrative offices that deal with social, health-related, educational and informational matters. They all work together to serve the region of Jubayl, not just the Phalangists.

In addition to my party responsibility, as head of the region I have political and morale-related responsibility in the Jubayl area. We are constantly concerned with the comfort, security and sound future of the citizens. We try very hard to provide all the necessities of life and solve any problems that might come up in cooperation with the agencies of the state and the official departments. It is our duty to assist them and assure the necessary climate for the performance of their work. Our responsibility also includes the area of security. This is in line with what the Phalange Party has done to defend the freedom of Lebanon and the dignity of its people. The head of the region has important responsibilities vis-a-vis the party, the citizenry, and the country.

We have decided to place all our intellectual and practical potential at the disposal of the Phalange and the region of Jubayl. We will devote ourselves completely and give freely, with a taste for the special pleasures to be found in serving the common good.

#### The Practical Program

[Question] Have you drawn up a practical program for the region? What are its broad outlines?

[Answer] Basically, we are responsible within the context of the Phalangist party structure. Everyone knows that it is an integral organization that has always demonstrated an effectiveness unknown by any other Lebanese party. It is a developed, modern structure that keeps pace with the requirements of human life. Our basic program is derived from the party's program and basic orientations: discipline and obedience to the regulations and the directives issued by the supreme president, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil.

With regard to the region of Jubayl, we take a special view of some local matters. We desire these things only for the good of the citizens and the region. Here are the most important ones:

1. Individual moral structure. By this we mean complete discipline and the preservation of the spirit of sacrifice by which members of the Phalange have been known. We must return constantly to the great principles and foundations according to which the Phalange Party was established. Today, we have a great need to educate citizens and party members so that they will have an elevated ethical sense and the right view of things. A sound citizenry is the basic foundation on which a sound country is built.

2. Infractions must be combatted, and the dignity of the citizens of Jubayl must be preserved, no matter what group they belong to. In our view, all the citizens are equal before the law and the truth. They are also equal in their



duties. No preference can be given to one citizen over another, except on the basis of his devotion and sacrifices. I call on all the citizens to bear their full national responsibilities.

#### The Region of Peace

He added: As is well known, the region of Jubayl contains numerous sects. Till this day, the region has continued to be an example of coexistence, harmony, and love. In the future, we will strive to see that nothing disturbs the security in this dear region. Rather, we hope it will enjoy still more peace and stability. In this regard, we express our respect and admiration for our late martyr, Ghayth al-Khuri, a man of peace in this region.

3. The general financial and economic situation has caused the Jubayl region to face numerous social and economic problems. We will try to ameliorate the burden they impose as much as we can. We know the needs of the region and the development studies it requires. Some have already been done, and we will complete whatever is necessary. In addition to all that, we will carry out construction and building programs in cooperation with the concerned official administrations, in view of the needs of the region.

4. We will participate effectively in the taking of national political decisions within the framework of the Phalangist political structure. We wish to have moderation, balance and intellectual arbitration in all our decisions. In this context, we must guide ourselves by truth and justice.

#### Supporting the Legitimate Authorities

5. One of the most important things we are trying to do in the Jubayl region is provide abundant and complete support for the course of salvation. We want to see the citizens and region of Jubayl rally around the legitimate authorities, so that we can create the necessary popular support for this course, which is led by His Excellency the president, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil.

Everyone knows how His Excellency has struggled to save the country and end the Lebanese tragedy. Everyone knows the difficulties he is facing because of the cruel war. We are joining the course of salvation in order to build a secure and stable future. We also must support, strengthen and encourage the legitimate institutions to play their full role.

In addition, we will use all our abilities to strengthen the Lebanese resistance, which has struggled for 10 years and played the leading role in keeping Lebanon free and independent. This is not to mention the sacrifices it has made and the historic accomplishments it has achieved. It has offered thousands of martyrs, at the head of whom stands the martyred president, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, who gathered all the Lebanese forces into one sound, national framework.

#### To the Citizens of Jubayl

[Question] Engineer al-Qirdahi had a word to say to the citizens of Jubayl:

[Answer] We would like to say something in all sincerity to our people in Jubayl and to every citizen of Jubayl. We will not abandon ourselves to promises. Rather, we swear to do what we can. We do not imagine that harmony and bliss will appear, as if one were witnessing a miracle in a dream. Rather, we say that there is still a long trail of sacrifice ahead, and that devotion is a daily duty, if the country is to be saved from its trial. Our enemies are still hoping that evil will befall Lebanon. Our duty is wakefulness and constant effort.

I call the citizens of Jubayl to separate themselves from fanaticism, selfishness, and backward thinking, so that our political path and struggle will proceed in a way consistent with the late 20th century. This includes little talk and few promises, but much work and achievement.

On the same occasion, we ask the party members and all other citizens of Jubayl to support and back the Lebanese cause with all the devotion and selflessness we have seen in them before. We constantly and always seek this patriotic and humane view of things from the directives of our supreme president, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil.

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CSO: 4404/454

LACK OF TOP ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AT CENTRAL BANK DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1435, 4 May 84 p 52

[Text] Administrative paralysis and confusion have afflicted the process of making administrative appointments in Lebanon for several months. This has produced serious gaps, which include the basic posts and positions that have remained vacant in the Bank of Lebanon. This institution is concerned with the most important and significant economic sector.

These gaps recently came prominently into view, in light of the difficulties witnessed by the Lebanese banking sector. This does not mean that filling the positions would have prevented the occurrence of the difficulties. However, it would have prevented many problems and sources of confusion and allowed several decisions to be taken at the right time.

Those who consider the administrative structure of the Bank of Lebanon might almost think that the bank's governor, Shaykh Michel al-Khuri, works without aids or advisors. There is an obvious gap between the head of the pyramid and the mid-level leadership.

The terms of service of the three deputy directors have ended, either because of their age or because the terms of their contracts ran out.

In both cases, it was thought improper to apply the principle of continuity and have them stay in their positions until replacements could be appointed.

With the deputies gone, a legal quorum was lacking in the bank's central council, which is supposed to perform several tasks, including approval of the bank's branches and studying of state loans. It is also supposed to make other decisions and deal with other vital issues having to do with the banking and monetary situation.

The Supreme Banking Authority, which is an advisory and reportorial agency within the Bank of Lebanon, is practically out of commission. It meets only in very urgent cases and with difficulty.

In addition, the Banking Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from the various sectors, has not existed for several years, although it represents the framework within which the views of the various sectors can come together to produce a definite monetary orientation.

If we go past the case of the deputy governors and the reportorial agencies to the secondary groups, we will find that six directorates in the Bank of Lebanon are being filled by deputy directors. Some of these directors head three directorates at the same time. These positions have been vacant since last July.

As for the Bank Monitoring Committee, which is the right arm of the governor of the Bank of Lebanon, it is also paralyzed. One of its members recently resigned, and no one has been appointed to replace him. Another member has been prevented from working on a regular basis by security considerations, while the chairman of the committee is kept busy by many matters. Some of these are known, but most of them are not.

These vacant posts are of vital importance under the current circumstances. It is incorrect to look at them as if they were vacancies occurring in the Ministry of the Economy or the Ministry of Tourism, for example. The recent problems in the banking sector, most of which could be overcome, confirm the vital character of these positions, especially since the governor of the Bank of Lebanon cannot fill them alone. Those holding these positions are privy to secrets and deal with issues that make it difficult to have one person do the appointing, even on a temporary basis.

Given this vacuum, it becomes useless for the governor of the Bank of Lebanon to move to appoint a number of advisors, though this is one of his basic powers. Such advisors are neither devoted nor responsible, and they do not solve the problem of the accumulating daily workload.

In fact, some hold the governor of the Bank of Lebanon responsible for the administrative situation in the central bank, although the governor is damaged more by this situation than anyone else. He has tried more than once to get the authorities to fill these vacancies, even gradually. Each time, the appointment was blocked by political and non-political considerations. The governor may be directly responsible for the vacuum in the directorates, but his hesitation in this regard has been intentional, since the higher posts are filled first. After that, those holding them consult collectively about filling the lower positions.

Each passing day shows how important it is to fill these gaps. At the same time, the monetary situation seems to be delicate. It is facing a series of challenges that do not need to be mentioned. Great fear exists that these appointments are being delayed until the governor's term ends this autumn. It is also feared that every vital administrative matter will have to wait for reconciliation. Even if a miracle happens and all the factions agree, they will find that there is nothing for them to agree on.

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MARONITE ARCHBISHOP HARB INTERVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1435, 4 May 84 pp 54-55

[Interview with Maronite Archbishop Shukrallah Harb, head of the diocese of Juniyah, by Sharbal Zaghib; date and place not specified]

[Text] Each time Lebanon passes through trials, eyes turn to Bkirki, because this edifice is the speaker and official spokesman of the Maronites in the east, as well as their first and last resort. Consequently, it plays the same role with respect to all the Christians. Though during a period of warfare the monastic orders tried to steal the thunder of Bkirki, this does not mean that the Maronite patriarchate has assumed the number two position in the Christian equation. Rather, it is permanently and always in the number one position.

The problem of this difficult element in the Lebanese equation does not lie merely in the fact that within the Christian equation it does not like to talk or take impromptu and arbitrary positions. Instead, it adopts its positions after a great deal of thought and intensive meetings. Each time the press tries to pluck new things from the mouth of Bkirki, the reply is that His Excellency the patriarch refuses to talk, and that he is committed to the official statements he has issued. We have tried in vain more than once to get the Maronite patriarch to give us additional clarifications concerning the official statements.

In the end, we had no choice but to throw light on the opinion of Bkirki on detailed matters by meeting with the "foreign minister" of Bkirki, his Eminence Archbishop Shukrallah Harb, the pastor of the Maronite diocese of Juniyah. He is the official in charge of the patriarchal institution's relations with the Christians of the world, especially those who have emigrated from Lebanon or are of Lebanese origin.

[Question] Has the dialogue being carried on by the Vatican with the Muslims produced concrete results?

[Answer] We know that humanity has advanced and developed. The important thing now is to limit oneself to the essence of the doctrine, according to the understanding of the people and in the context of a particular time and the civilization in which they find themselves. The essence does not change; only the external aspects do. The mentality that used to call for using the



sword to convert people to the faith is no longer acceptable today. No one holds to it any longer. Respect for human beings has become part of the behavior of every religion and group. We Christians call for love on the basis of the statement, "Love one another." We love each human being because he is a creature of God, may He be exalted. We believe in dialogue with all people, but it must occur with love and education, so that there will be a way to convince others.

On the basis of the sanctity of dialogue, we have carried out a dialogue with the Muslims. It is natural for this dialogue to produce positive results, since we get to know each other through contact. On the other hand, separation gives birth to ignorance, and human beings dislike what they do not know. We are trying to get to know each other and put a stop to all the reflex reactions and sectarian bigotry, which tear down instead of building up.

[Question] It is said about the Lebanese war that it is a Christian war for hegemony over Lebanon. It is also said that it is an Islamic war to Islamize Lebanon. From the Christian perspective, what is Bkirki's opinion on this war?

[Answer] From the Christian perspective, we reject all warfare, because it is the most repulsive instrument on earth through which human beings deal with each other. Moreover, the Christian religion forbids this instrument, because God said, "Do not kill." Bkirki cannot have an opinion at variance with the general Christian opinion, which was entrusted to us by the Messiah.

Let me ask those who say it is a Maronite war for hegemony over Lebanon whether the Maronites began the war? It may be true that in the course of the war some Maronites were trained to bear arms and were immersed in the game of war. However, they did not do so because they were fanciers of war, but in order to defend themselves, their beliefs, their lives, and their dignity in the face of a plot aimed against their existence by the superpowers and by the neighboring states, whose goal was to solve the Palestinian problem at the expense of the Christians in Lebanon.

Despite all that, we have complete confidence in the Islamic sects and their true leaders, who believe in justice, neighborliness, and respect for others, especially the Christian sects. They want reconciliation, peace and peaceful coexistence among all Lebanese without exception and hidden goals. However, these people have not had control of matters in the streets, which have been in the hands of those who carry rifles.

[Question] We must say that the Muslims also raise the charge of bearing rifles. They say that a group of Maronites have been bearing arms in order to make war on them, and even that a current within the clergy has been calling openly for the bearing of arms and headlong entry into the game of war. How is it possible to reconcile these two charges?

[Answer] I do not deny that some men of religion have encouraged our youth to bear arms in order to defend the Christian presence in Lebanon. If during the war their thinking develops in the direction of control and hegemony, this does not mean that Bkirki and the Christians are unanimously of this opinion. On this basis, the clergy as a group cannot support the war and call for it. Even if some individuals deviate, this does not mean that all have done so.

I would like to repeat the opinion of Bkirki here. It calls for love, peace, and dialogue among the Lebanese, so that all may be reconciled. We can do nothing but apply the sublime principles of the Gospel, which tend in this direction.

[Question] Bkirki has called for some time for the holding of a spiritual summit between the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. Do you believe that such a summit might solve the complex political problems in Lebanon?

[Answer] It is certain that the solution to Lebanon's problems is not in the hands of the politicians alone, because every one of them is looking after his own interests and goals and trying to reach what he desires, no matter what the cost. Here the men of religion can intervene to calm the air and soothe the politicians. They can do this via a spiritual summit, which would call for the adoption in human relations of the sublime principles in which all religions believe.

[Question] Do you mean that the spiritual summit could put a brake on the politicians or solve the political problems?

[Answer] We are trying to set a limit that will aid in the solution, because the men of religion are not being asked to come up with a political solution. Rather, we always use the method of pointing out and drawing attention to the sublime principles that the politicians must adopt in order to solve the problems with which we have been wrestling for a long time.

[Question] At the last Christian summit, a difference of opinion appeared between the Orthodox and the Maronites. Is this difference a disagreement concerning their respective views on Lebanon, or does it have to do with their views on how Christians should work with Muslims in Lebanon?

[Answer] I do not believe that this difference in points of view was the result of an essential disagreement. Rather, it is merely a question of each Christian using whatever means he thinks are appropriate. In the end, these various measures work for the common good.

[Question] In your capacity as the foreign minister of Bkirki, do you think that the reports coming from abroad indicate that pessimism exists concerning the situation in Lebanon? Or is optimism with respect to the next stage still predominant?

[Answer] It is clear that the Lebanese Christians abroad have great problems that are no less severe than the problems we inside the country have. They look at the fatherland in the same way we do. They are working for the survival of individual liberty in Lebanon and for the human rights and dignity of each Lebanese. Of course, everyone, both inside and outside the country, is worried about the fate of the homeland, because numerous groups both here and abroad are trying to smash the foundations of this country. They are working to restrain it with frequent upsets. We must try to lay down and preserve the broad outlines that can be used in our life in the future, and we must live a round of life without disagreeing. The Christians definitely want to work out a solution that will preserve them from provocations and harassment in the near

future, for these actions may destroy Lebanon and endanger not only the Christians, but all Lebanese. We want a unified Lebanon in which the rights of all the sects will be preserved and protected.

[Question] There is some divergence in the interpretation of the word "rights." Some think all Lebanese should have all rights, while others think certain rights are for a certain group. How does Bkirkki interpret the word "rights"?

[Answer] There must be mutual understanding of rights, because rights such as freedom have origins and limits. When diverse groups are found in a particular country, it is necessary for them to achieve a mutual understanding of the way to live, for if one of the groups is small and weak, it will definitely fear for its fate and existence in the future. If some sects in Lebanon have preserved certain rights, they have done so in order to maintain their survival and future, and to avoid being threatened by sudden death and extermination.

[Question] However, we are talking about agreement on rights the Lebanese may not achieve in the near future. The proof is that the Lausanne conference postponed the solutions. What is your opinion?

[Answer] I pray and hope that the Lebanese will reach an agreement among themselves in the near future, because such an agreement is very important. This is especially true given the extent situation in Lebanon, with each sect trying to preserve itself and its existence. Quite frankly, we are afraid of facing perpetual war every 10 years. Therefore, we demand some assurances for the life of an entire society. These assurances must come from the other factions, without being an urgent demand by the Christians.

[Question] A kind of exodus in the ranks of the Christians has been noted, especially among the young. What is the immediate cause of this exodus? Is it fear of war, or are there other reasons?

[Answer] The direct cause of the emigration is the war itself, and not the fear of war, because the economic state of affairs we have reached is no longer tolerable. Most factories and places of work have closed their doors, been razed, or been forced to dismiss their workers. Therefore, those without work are forced to emigrate in order to provide food for themselves and their families by the sweat of their brow and in a legitimate fashion. Both Muslims and Christians face this problem. We must work to limit this emigration by devising political solutions to the problems from which we suffer and reducing the tone of violence and attempts to gain personal or sectarian benefits at the expense of the country and people.

[Question] One of the solutions being proposed for the Lebanese crisis is complete sectarianism. It is said that the Christian clergymen, unlike the politicians, reject this solution. Is this correct?

[Answer] In our situation here in Lebanon, secularism can be a political solution, but neither we nor the Muslims think well of it. We think that marriage is a sacred religious matter among Muslims and Christians alike, and even among those who are outside Islam and Christianity. Though secularism may be a political solution to the Lebanese crisis, this does not mean that marriage must submit to this non-religious solution. Civil marriage is not marriage; it is non-religious communal living, and we reject it.

12224

CSO: 4404/454

AFGHAN CLANDESTINE REPORTS ON RECENT 'VICTORIES'

GF190647 (Clandestine) Voice of Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan in Dari  
1717 GMT 18 May 84

[Text] Our Muslim and Mujahid brothers at all the fronts and institutions of our country, Afghanistan, are continuing their operations. Every day the defeated and accursed forces of the heretics are suffering heavy losses at the hands of our combatants. According to reports received from Theipaktia Province, this week our Muslim and revolutionary brothers, in a quick and sudden attack, killed 22 of the joint forces of the Sovvas and Karmal regime. In this successful operation our brothers succeeded in destroying two enemy tanks with rocket attacks. At an enemy military post in Gorgan district our Mujahid and Muslim brothers killed 60 Soviet invaders and captured 7 of them. In this attack a quantity of their arms and ammunition fell to the hands of our brothers.

During the current week our self-sacrificing youngmen carried out a series of military operations in Konduz Province against the interfering Soviet forces and the deceived personnel of the mercenaries of Babrak Karmal regime and succeeded in inflicting losses on them. In the course of these successful operations, at least 10 of the Soviet forces were killed and several of their tanks were set ablaze. In a clash in the Shakkar Darreh region in Kabul Province, our Mujahid brothers succeeded in setting ablaze an enemy tank and killing 10 soldiers. According to the same report, in another clash in the (Kalay Qazi) region of Kabur Province, our combatant brothers destroyed two tanks of the invading Soviet enemy and sent several of their soldiers to hell. As a result of an enemy tank hitting a mine which was planted by our brothers close to the province of Herat, eight of the men in the tank were killed and several Red Army soldiers were wounded.

CSO: 4665/35

## PROBLEMS WITH ERECTION OF BANGLADESH BORDER FENCE TOLD

## Building Begun, Plans Described

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 17 Apr 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] ERECTION of barbed wire fences to check infiltration from Bangladesh has begun at the trijunction of West Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh borders, according to senior Union Home Ministry officials. Engineers of the Central Public Works Department are erecting the fences in three rows one behind the other. The height of the first row of fence will be 3 feet 6 inches while the other two will be five feet high.

There will be a 4-ft gap between two fences where rolled barbed wires will be laid to make the fence impenetrable. According to an official estimate, the cost of erecting one kilometre of fence will be about Rs 3.5 lakhs.

The officials said that erection of the fence had begun at Ramraikuthi, about 45 km east of Cooch Behar. Thousands of reinforced concrete pillars are being moulded. These will be put up along the border to hold the barbed wires. For properly securing the fence, each strand of barbed wire, horizontally placed, will be laid at a distance of five inches from the other.

For the present, the CPWD engineers are working on 100-metre stretch where the erection work will be completed in the next few weeks. The Union Government wants to complete erection of the fence on 100-km stretch from the trijunction towards Dhubri this year. The Government's keenness to complete work on this section early is to show the agitators in Assam that it is firm on keeping its commitment to check infiltration from Bangladesh.

The fence is being erected through a low-lying terrain which is prone to flooding six months in the year. The pillars are being secured by embedding them on concrete foundations. Home Ministry officials said the CPWD engineers were now busy surveying the area where the fence would be erected for building a network of roads which would run parallel to the fence. The road is necessary for the BSF to petrol and for the maintenance of the fence.

The officials said that when the first concrete pillar of the fence was put up at Ramaikuthi on April 5, "a tense and high drama" was witnessed by many with the border forces of both sides training their guns and mortars at each other.



The Commander of the Bangladesh Rifles had told his Indian counterpart of the BSF that Bangladesh would not allow erection of any fence along its border. He had indicated that his order was that if need be, he would use force to stop the erection work. The BDR, the officials said, dug trenches and built other defensive positions along the border. The BDR strength had been reinforced.

The Home Ministry officials said the BSF commanders had made it clear to the BDR commander that Indian engineers and workers would go ahead with the erection work notwithstanding the protest from Bangladesh. In fact the erection work is being done under the protection of the BSF.

The Home Ministry officials said the CPWD had been instructed to fence off another 100-km stretch of the West Dinajpur-Bangladesh border through which large-scale infiltration from Bangladesh takes place. The work on the Dinajpur stretch will begin probably at the end of this year.

#### Tension on Border

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 23 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Manash Ghosh]

[Text] SATRASAL (ASSAM), April 22--Tension and an uneasy calm prevailed at this strategically located trijunction of Assam, West Bengal and Bangladesh borders, the scene of last Friday's border skirmishes between Indian and Bangladeshi forces in which a BDR jawan was killed and two others were seriously injured.

It was the erection of barbed wire fences on the Assam side of the border, to check infiltration from Bangladesh, that led to Friday's shoot-out. But it is not yet clear what impact the incident will have on India going ahead with the erection work. Yesterday, the Central Public Works Department engineers could do no work because of mounting tension on the border. They are awaiting instructions from Delhi.

Many of them are sceptical about an early resumption, because of the massing of forces along the border. Indian officials think that the BDR wants to keep the issue hot to stall the work, which is its ultimate objective. Rows of trenches, bunkers and fox holes have come up on both sides.

Friday's incidents had all the ingredients of high drama. According to Indian officials it began in the morning, when about 1,000 Bangladeshi civilians accompanied by armed BDR men came right up to the border here where concrete posts--on which the barbed wires are to be fixed--had been built. For several hours, the Bangladeshi civilians shouted slogans demanding the dismantling of the posts. They reportedly said that if this was not done, they themselves would pull them down.

A BDR captain told a BSF commander that he had been instructed not to allow the erection of the fences and to dismantle the posts.

The BSF officials reportedly told the BDR captain that their orders were to ensure that fencing went ahead smoothly without any BDR interference. He was asked to persuade his nationals to go away from the border.

The BSF officials here, said that it was some time in the afternoon, after the Bangladeshi civilians had left, that an attempt was made by the BDR to pull down the first two rows of pillars. The BDR men standing very close to the border flung an innovative contraption made of two long bamboos, whose heads were tied with a rope around the two concrete posts and started pulling them down on their side of the border. The BSF officials said that the BDR had long before dug six-ft-deep trenches along the zero line of the border, which had partially weakened the concrete foundations of the two posts.

An Indian official said: "The idea was that with the help of the device they would pull the posts down without entering our territory. Our boys resisted. There was a tug of war with the contraption for about 10 minutes between both the border forces. After this contraption was broken, a second one was brought in. There was again a tug of war. When we managed to snatch it too the BDR fired from stenguns and light machine-guns. We returned the fire. The shoot-out lasted about 15 minutes. Our firing was controlled and effective. Hence the BDR casualty".

The body of the BDR jawan remained in the trench for about 12 hours after which BDR officials carrying a truce flag took it away.

Never before has such a serious incident, involving the two border forces taken place. Indian officials here are optimistic that political intervention at the highest level will be able to alter the situation. They feel that work on the fences ought to have been taken up simultaneously at seven or eight border points instead of one. This would have made it difficult for Bangladesh to concentrate its attack on one point.

#### Bangladesh Action Reported

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Sivadas Banerjee]

[Excerpt] SATRASAL (near Dhubri), April 23. A LONG stretch of the international border has become li-e again by the Bangladesh action in pulling down one of the 16 pillars erected for barbed wire fencing.

The incident climaxed in an exchange of fire on April 19 in which three Bangladesh troops were believed to have been killed. One of the bodies were retracted from the Indian side a day later.

Reports filtering through the border suggest that most of the population along a 300-metre belt has been evacuated and their homes taken over by the

Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). A peep into the area from tree-tops revealed hectic activity like digging of trenches and bunkers going on across the border.

The work on erecting the fences has since been suspended and local sources said they did not know when it would be resumed.

#### Workers Panicky

The CPWD, which is putting up the fences with the help of local contractors, is in a jam because workers are panicky. No one is allowed to go near the border for fear of stray bullets.

For the inhabitants of this small village, the evening of April 19 reminded them of 1971 when rifle, sten-gun and light machine-gun bullets whizzed past their homes. The Border Security Force (BSF) replied adequately. In the adjoining Jhawkatni village, an elder said he had to postpone the wedding in the family because of the prevailing tension.

Considering the shrill protests coming from Bangladesh over the erection of fences, the authorities expected some trouble but what actually took place was not anticipated. As soon as the workers started digging, they came up against Chinese-type tactics of human waves.

A 3,000-strong crowd gate-crashed across the border and jostled and pushed the heavily-outnumbered workers. After some time, they withdrew but were seen digging a two-metre-deep and one-metre-wide trench along their side of the border, leaving a bare foot-long gap from the line where the pillars were put up.

The implication of digging the trench was quite clear, for when this trench was filled with rain water, the pillars would collapse. It was from the cover of this trench that a school teacher from the adjoining Tellal village in Bangladesh pulled down one of the pillars by lassoing it and heightening the tension to the flashpoint.

The work on the fencing was started at the trijunction of West Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh, exactly at the international boundary pillar No. 1,001, from which point the Assam Border Security Force takes off. Pillar No. 1,001 can be overseen from the two BSF outposts. Ramraikuthi in Assam and Jhowkuthi in West Bengal, but is nearer to the former.

The fencing was apron-type with two rows of pillars, about a metre and a half apart. The pillars in the first row, to be put up nine inches away from the international borderline, will be eight feet high from the ground with their tops turned in an angle towards Bangladesh, so as to cover the space left at the base.

The second row, to support the first, will be five feet high and the gap in between will have rolled barbed wire, to make the fence difficult to penetrate. Barbed wire will also string the two rows of pillars.

Bangladesh appears to have mounted a feverish campaign telling the people that this fence will be electrified and, therefore, posed a danger to its people, particularly children and cattle.

India's case that this fence will protect the people on both sides from trans-border dacoities and theft of cattle, which have been the cause of tension, does not seem to have been taken heed of.

#### Dividing Families

Ramraikuthi and Jhowkuthi villages are a stone's throw away from each other but when the fence comes up, communication between the two will be through a circuitous road. Many families have relatives in both and their visits to each other will be disrupted when the fence is completed.

So attempts at cutting the wires or damaging the fencing are not ruled out. For the time being, it will be a problem for the Assam government to cope with but by the end of this year when the fencing is expected to be completed, it will be so far the West Bengal government, too.

The first concrete pillar in this sector was put up on April 5. When the Bangladesh Rifles told the BSF that they would resist putting up the pillars "with all available force," both sides trained guns on each other. Tensions mounted thereafter leading to the clash between the two on April 19. Since then, the Bangladeshis have been strengthening their positions without let-up.

The local people view Bangladesh's action as a means to provide the Dhaka regime with a break in the political situation at home and a so to seek material help from friendly countries like the U.S. and China in a much bigger way than before.

India's desire is to complete the fencing of at least a 100-km stretch along the 1,500-km-long Assam-Bangladesh border by the end of this year. This will display the government's seriousness about the promise for insulating the border against infiltration.

The pillars are being secured by embedding them on concrete foundations, but the trench being dug by the Bangladeshis on their side poses a serious threat to the pillars' safety.

#### India Reported Firm

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Seema Mustafa]

[Text]

**New Delhi, April 23:** The home ministry, which is determined to complete the initial phase of construction of the barbed wire fence along the Indo-Bangla border, has still not been able to chalk out the exact course of the

entire fence.

This complex question of determining the precise boundary between the two countries is still under the "consideration" of several committees. Sources here point out that the construc-

tion of the fence in the Dhubri district of Assam, which has sparked off the current controversy, is just a "test" case to work out any modifications that might arise out of the implementation of the scheme. This phase is intended to cover just 5 km of the border.

Officials are tightlipped about the time allocated to complete this initial phase, although they admit that it has received a setback because of the tension and firing on the Bangladesh side of the border. The sources said the home ministry has been examining every aspect of the scheme for nearly a year now and "there is no question of backing out."

The fence is being constructed along the border and is just over eight feet high. Bangladesh is objecting to it because it will check illegal migration from

that country into India. BSF sources are of the view that the demonstration by Bangladeshi villagers was organised by the authorities there as the fence will restrict smuggling as well as the weekly barter markets held by smugglers from both sides of the border. For some villages smuggling is the only means of livelihood, it is pointed out.

The BSF officials, however, are concerned about the additional patrolling that the barbed wire fence will entail. The BSF does not have the manpower for this.

Home ministry officials point out that the disputed boundary areas are not being covered by the scheme until the demarcation is decided. In many villages the boundary cuts through houses and in large sections it merely remains a "vague understanding" and is not a clear line even on paper.

#### Foreign Ministry Comment

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Text]

New Delhi, April 23: The external affairs ministry reaffirmed today that the fence being erected on the Indo-Bangla border was well within the framework of the guidelines agreed to by the director-generals of the BSF and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) on June 4, 1975.

The guidelines provide for the prevention of infiltration and smuggling. The erection of the fence was related to this, said a spokesman of the ministry.

The guidelines had also stipulated that no defensive structure was to be put up within 150 yards of the border to make both policing easier and to prevent clashes. The fence, the spokesman maintained, was within 150

yards but was not a defensive structure.

WB villages: On Bangladesh's territorial claim on three villages in North Bengal, the spokesman said the confusion was due to the erection of certain pillars during a recent survey. The problem would be looked into according to the procedures laid down for settling territorial border claims.

Measures were being taken to defuse the tension following the exchange of firing last Friday. The high commissioner of Bangladesh was called to the external affairs ministry to discuss the incident. The spokesman was, however, unable to say whether work on the fence had been resumed.

#### G. K. Reddy Reports Incident

Madras THE HINDU in English 25 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, April 24.  
There was renewed firing today by the Bangladesh Rifles at Sonahat in the Goalpara

sector in which two Indian Border Security Force personnel were injured and an intermittent exchange of fire was still continuing, according



to latest reports reaching Delhi.

The Bangladesh Rifles opened fire without any warning when Indian workers resumed the barbed wire fence construction on the Assam border, where work had been suspended for the last four days following the first incident on Saturday last.

At one stage the Bangladesh Government had sent an army contingent to the area, but it was subsequently withdrawn following a stern warning by India that it would be held responsible for the grave consequences of any military intervention. It was the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), that opened fire today on CPWD personnel erecting the fence on the Indian side.

In the first incident on Saturday last, a Bangladesh jawan was killed and two BSF men were injured, while in today's firing two more Indian jawans including a sub-inspector suffered bullet injuries, according to information available in Delhi. But the casualties could be higher since the exchange of fire was resumed this afternoon, despite India's efforts to persuade Bangladesh to stop this aggressive action.

### India's hope

A spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs said that India "profoundly hoped that Bangladesh will cease these provocations". India was not seeking any kind of conflict, but it expected Bangladesh to respect its sovereign right to erect this fence on its side of the border to check illegal immigration.

After the first incident on April 21, the spokesman pointed out that India had shown great restraint by suspending work to let Bangladesh reconsider its position, but the firing was resumed when work was restarted today at Sonahat. His remarks clearly implied that India was determined to go ahead with the construction of the fence despite Bangladesh's opposition.

The spokesman, who gave details of today's incident, said that an Indian survey party with one subordinate officer and 20 other ranks of the BSF as escorts started work at pillar 1007 at 10 a.m. today. At about 10-45 a.m. a jeep from the Bangladesh side stopped opposite to the pillar and the man inside the vehicle, a local BDR commander, ordered his men to open fire. The BSF personnel returned the fire and when last reports came in at 2 p.m. the firing by BDR men was still continuing and the Indian survey party was still under fire.

These deplorable incidents are not likely to blow up into a major border skirmish involving army contingents on either side. But the

Government of India cannot allow itself to be bullied or intimidated in this fashion by a neighbouring country in complete violation of all international norms purely for domestic political reasons.

The sad part of it all is that at no stage has Bangladesh seriously challenged India's right to erect this fence on its side of the border for whatever reason. The lame argument advanced in the wake of last Saturday's incident that the construction of this barbed wire fence violated the agreed ground rules between the BDR and BSF not to construct any defence structures within 150 metres on either side of the border could not apply to the erection of a barbed wire fence that had no military significance.

The Bangladesh authorities have been saying in the course of private diplomatic conversations that they were not questioning India's right to erect this fence, but only deploring the move since it was a reflection on their good neighbourly relations. The implications of this move, according to them, was that India did not trust Bangladesh's *bona fide* efforts to stop infiltration from its side.

The two Governments have exchanged protest notes and talks are taking place through diplomatic channels to settle this unfortunate tangle. But as far as India is concerned it is not likely to go back on its decision to build this Rs. 450 crore fence which is a part of its commitment to control illegal immigration into Assam.

### Watch towers

PTI reports from Dhaka:

Bangladesh has decided to erect watch towers all along the border with India for "increased surveillance," according to an official announcement here today.

It said 24 watch towers would be constructed initially. Construction would begin immediately, the announcement said.

Though the announcement did not give any further detail, observers believe that it was designed to counter the erection of the barbed wire fencing by India.

Sheikh Hasina Wajed, president of the Bangladesh Awami League has expressed her party's "deep concern" at the recent incidents with India on the barbed wire fencing issue.

In a statement issued in Dhaka last night, Sheikh Hasina said that the incident tantamounted to a blow to the national independence and interests of Bangladesh. The Indo-Bangladesh border agreement signed by the two Governments during her father Sheikh Mujib's rule in 1974 could not be implemented due to a "weak policy" of the successive Governments in Dhaka.

## Border Villages Discussed

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 25 Apr 84 pp 1, 9

[Article by Manash Ghosh]

[Text] JALPAIGURI, April 24--The fate of 270 Indian residents of Khudipara and Singhipara villages, about 30 km south-east of this district headquarter, right on the Indo-Bangladesh border, hangs in the balance, as the border surveyors of India and Bangladesh and the two Governments decide which of the two countries is their owner.

The two adjoining villages in the administrative jurisdiction of Jalpaiguri district with an area of about 101 acres, have recently become the centre of controversy raising questions about the status, use and ownership of "adverse possessions" held by both the countries along their border. Both villages form part of the Nagar Berubari gram panchayat adjoining South Berubari which for about two decades had been an emotional issue with the local people many of whom had fought political and legal battles to stall its transfer to Pakistan.

Both the villages according to Government of India maps, are said to be in "India's adverse possession"--a term which means that a territory which may rightfully belong to one country is actually in the possession of the other. The issue of adverse possessions has long been an irritant in India's relations with the erstwhile East Pakistan Government and later with Bangladesh. The genesis of the problem lay in the misinterpretation and wrong implementation of the Radcliff Award which had carved out West Bengal and East Pakistan. Since Partition neither side has shown any eagerness to sort out the issue and resolve it.

Indian officials here said that the status of adverse possession of these two villages was first discovered in the middle of last month when a joint team of surveyors from India and Bangladesh camped near these two villages and surveyed the border and its pillars for about 10 days. According to them this was the first time since Partition that a joint survey team visited the area and did its detailed survey work. The team is again due in the villages early next month.

The arrival of the survey team on March 9 and circulation of a message sent from across the border which asked the villagers to leave Khudipara and Singhipara, caused panic. The villagers rushed here on March 18 and informed the district administration that they would have to leave their homes as the villages belonged to Bangladesh.

But interestingly, Bangladesh has so far not laid its claim on these two villages. Their dominating features are their bamboo groves and betel trees. Almost all the residents of the two villages are Muslims.

The West Bengal Government officials here, however, were not aware that these villages were in India's "adverse possession" till the villagers informed them. This they said was because the Survey of India maps on Berubari and the adjoining areas had not been published because of the controversy on the handing over of the territory to Pakistan.

"The West Bengal Government has irrefutable proof to claim these villages and it can be backed up by documents. They have, since Partition been part and parcel of this district", said a senior district official of Jalpaiguri.

The residents of the two villages pay land road and panchayat taxes and education cess and have all along been voting in the parliamentary Assembly and panchayat elections.

In fact all the 136 voters of these villages had exercised their franchise in the last panchayat elections and even got Abdul Haq of Khudipara elected to Nagar Berubari gram panchayat on a CPI (M) ticket.

West Bengal Government officials said that Abdul Haq was in possession of a document which conclusively proved the Indians' claim on the two villages.

The land deed executed by his grandfather at the district sub-registrar's office in Jalpaiguri on June 31, 1940, clearly states that Khudipara was part of Jalpaiguri which under the Radcliffe Award was given to India.

Abdul Haq has made xeros copies of this document which has been forwarded both to the West Bengal Government and the Government of India.

Another land deed executed in 1945 by a resident of Singhipara also shows that the villages then were under Jalpaiguri police station. Both Abdul Haq and Sheikh Khamiruddin, a local schoolteacher, who were the first to move the district administration to protect the interest of the two villages, said that they and other residents had cast their lot with India. "We shall resist attempts if they are given over to Bangladesh. Our party leaders are seized of the matter and have referred it to Delhi" said Abdul Haq.

What West Bengal Government officials are apprehending is that any more border survey would certainly result in the detection of more "adverse possessions" which would pose serious economic political and law and order problems. "The survey work should either be postponed or taken up only after the West Bengal Government and Delhi have sorted out the issue" said a prominent Forward Bloc leader of Jalpaiguri town "otherwise the issue, like Berubari, has a very disturbing potential of giving rise to a popular movement", he pointed out.

#### Bangladesh Border Buildup

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 25 Apr 84 p 9

[Text] A BANGLADESH Army battalion, backed up by artillery, moved within six kilometres of Satrasal village on the Assam-Bangladesh border on April 20 when

a Bangladesh Rifles man was killed and two others were injured in an exchange of fire between the BDR and the Border Security Force, it was learnt from Central Government sources in Calcutta on Tuesday. The Indian Army authorities have been kept informed of the situation.

Information collected by Central agencies revealed that the Bangladesh battalion had been stationed at Barangamari village in a school building, the sources said. The supporting artillery consisted mainly of howitzer-type guns. It was learnt that the battalion started moving into the village a few days before last week's skirmish. The unit was believed to have been mobilized from the Rangpur cantonment which is about 20 km from the village.

Though the ostensible purpose of the mobilization was said to be a training exercise, observers believed that the real reason was to provide moral support to the BDR in thwarting India's attempts to erect fences along the Indo-Bangladesh border in Assam as well as to provide a back-up force. Night curfew had been clamped in the village where the Army battalion was stationed, apparently to prevent civilians from keeping an eye on its activities, and the vehicles and equipment were heavily camouflaged.

The strength of the BDR had also been increased in the disturbed sector with the induction of about four companies which had been mobilized from BDR posts elsewhere. Earlier, one BDR battalion was in charge of the area. Part of the additional force had been kept in reserve at Kurigram and the rest deployed.

There was an early indication that trouble might start in the area. Some senior BDR officials visited the disturbed area in a helicopter on April 17 and again on April 20. Villages within two kilometres of the border were evacuated about seven days before the incident, the sources said.

Bangladesh civilians protesting against the erection of fences had adopted the tactic of lying down on the zero line so that the pillars could not be erected. Some of them were believed to have been hired for the purpose.

Attempts to exploit the border skirmish politically had already started, the sources said. A political party organized meetings and processions at Rangpur, Comilla and Mymensingh condemning the BSF firing and criticizing India's attempts to erect fences. A demonstration was organized outside the office of the Assistant High Commissioner of India at Rajshahi on Sunday.

The BDR has also stepped up activities along the West Bengal border following the incidents on the Assam border. Indian security forces have gathered that the BDR fear that India might put up fences along the West Bengal border as well. Construction of watchtowers had heightened the suspicion.

The sources, however, emphasized that the main purpose of the watch-towers was to check smuggling. Though the towers would be equipped with infra-red night vision devices, these were yet to arrive in most of the towers. The infra-red devices would enable one to see up to 800 yards. A joint meeting of BSF and BDR personnel is scheduled at Haridaspur border on April 26 to discuss common problems along the South Bengal border.

## Home Minister's Remarks

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 27 Apr 84 p 1

[Text]

Home Minister P C Sethi told Parliament on Thursday that fencing work along the Bangladesh border would continue simultaneously with all diplomatic efforts to persuade the Dhaka authorities to "respect our sovereign decision" in this regard.

However, if danger arose from that side or, for that matter, from any side, the Government was well prepared to defend the country's borders, he added.

Mr Sethi was replying to points raised during a debate in Parliament on the recent incidents along the Bangladesh border.

Mr Sethi said that the fence now being built was not a defensive structure but was essentially protective. The fence would remove the major irritant between Bangladesh and India by preventing infiltration across the border and was, therefore, in the best interests of the two countries.

He added that the fence in no way violated the 1973 agreement with Bangladesh. Replying to questions whether the Government had before starting work on the fence explained to Bangladesh that it was not meant against its interests, Mr Sethi said that External Affairs Minister P V Narasimha Rao had during his visit to Dhaka in August 1983, explained the rationale of the fence to the authorities there. He stressed that the fence was not a bilateral issue anyway.

Both in the Rajya Sabha and in the Lok Sabha, where DSP member R N Rakesh initiated the debate, members from all parties supported the Government decision to build the fence, though many like Mr Satya Sadhan Chakraborty (CPI-M), Mr Chitta Basu (FB), Mrs Geeta Mukherjee (CPI), Mr Abdul Rashid Kabuli (NC) in the Lok Sabha, and Mr Kalyan Roy (CPI), Mrs Kanak Mukherjee (CPI-M) and Mr R Ramakrishnan (AIADMK) stressed that the fence alone would not be sufficient to check infiltration into India, which required increased vigilance and mutual understanding between the two countries.

There was, however, a lone, though strong, voice against the very idea of fencing the border. That was of Mr A K Roy (Ind) who spoke vehemently

against fencing, saying that it was against the Indian cultural traditions and was the result of the Government's surrender to "the most racist and fascist" elements in the country.

All members from the ruling party as well as the opposition stressed that the issue must be dealt with firmness but in a spirit of friendship. Understanding and magnanimity in the best Indian traditions of dealing with its neighbours. There was a strong and repeated insistence from all speakers that the Government not let itself be provoked by any action from the Bangladesh side. Whatever the provocation, it should pursue the policy of persuading the Dhaka authorities and taking them into confidence.

There was also a broad agreement among all the speakers.

It were Mr Madhavaro Scindia, Mr Brijmohan Mohanty and Mr Rajesh from the ruling party and Mr Chandraseet Yadav (Janwadi), Mr Jagpal Singh (LD) and Mr Chitta Basu who said that the provocative actions of the Bangladesh authorities were basically aimed at diverting the attention of the restless masses demanding democratic rights there. Whatever the Government of India decided to do must take this point into consideration.

There were frequent references to the attempts of foreign powers to — and some members like Mr Yadav, Mr Kalyan Roy and Mr Scindia clearly named it as the US — turn India's neighbours against it. They saw the recent happenings along the border in this perspective and cautioned the Government to beware of the efforts of the inimical big power (US) to drive India into trouble with its neighbors.

Mr Brijmohan Mohanty (Cong-I) was most categorical in this regard. He said that the US animosity against India was evident ever since India had become chairman of the non-aligned movement. The US did not want India to stand as a champion of the non-aligned and developing world.

CSO: 4600/1807



## ROW OVER BORDER FENCE A 'NEEDLESS CONFRONTATION'

Madras THE HINDU in English 3 May 84 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, May 2.

The Governments of India and Bangladesh are trying to resolve the controversy over the erection of the barbed wire fence through quiet diplomacy without embarrassment to either side, if possible.

As a first step towards a mutually acceptable arrangement, the two Governments have agreed that the Directors-General of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) should meet following the established practice.

The BSF-BDR talks will be aimed primarily at averting the danger of a renewed clash when the Indian workers resume the construction of the fence. Simultaneously, efforts are being made at the political level to evolve a procedure for putting up the fence on the Indian side consistent with its sovereign rights, without prejudice to Bangladesh's contention that there was no need for it.

**Not suspended**

But the construction of the border fence has not been suspended, although the work has not been resumed in the absence of adequate security arrangements for protecting the CPWD personnel engaged in putting up the pillars for stringing the barbed wire. The BSF units deployed in the area to provide protective cover to them have been displaying exemplary restraint in the face of grave provocation by Bangladesh Rifles because India does not want this controversy to escalate into a border clash involving the Army contingents.

The construction work has been temporarily halted to let the tempers in Bangladesh cool a bit before the BSF and BDR chiefs meet to discuss the problem. But it is not going

to be easy for the Bangladesh Government to retrace its steps after making such a big issue of it, without some symbolic gesture by India to save its face.

The question is how far can India go to enable the Bangladesh President, Gen. H. M. Ershad, to let this border fence be put up without appearing to be meekly yielding to the Indian determination to go ahead with the construction by ignoring his strong opposition to it. But what has been infuriating India is the pretence of Bangladesh that there is no exodus at all from its side and that there was no need at all for this fence.

**Feelings embittered**

The issue has certainly embittered feelings and given Gen. Ershad's opponents a chance to denounce him as a timid man who is either unwilling or incapable of resisting this alleged affront which is deemed to be an unfriendly act intended to humiliate the Bangladesh people. A more sensible response should have been a display of firm determination by Bangladesh to seal the border from its side to prevent further migration into neighbouring Indian States.

But Gen. Ershad and his advisers have chosen to play to the gallery by denouncing the Indian decision as a threat to the security and territorial integrity of Bangladesh, as though India was bent on practising its own brand of hegemonism. The sad part of this controversy is that they know quite well that India is well within its sovereign rights to put up this fence and yet they have unwittingly allowed themselves to become prisoners of their own bluff and bluster to the point of foreclosing the options open for an honourable retreat from this needless confrontation.

## SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH MEXICO

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 25 Apr 84 p 1

[Text] MEXICO CITY--April 24--President Zail Singh's three-day goodwill State visit to Mexico commenced on a propitious note yesterday with the two countries signing two separate agreements to further intensify their co-operation in the fields of science and technology on the one hand and education and culture on the other, report PTI and UNI.

Mr Natwar Singh, Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry and leader of the high-level official team accompanying the President, signed the agreements on behalf of India while Mrs Luz De, acting Under-Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs, initialled the agreements on behalf of Mexico.

The areas covered under the science and technology programme include forestry, machine tool technology, information science, renewable sources of energy, utilization of bagasse, mining and water resources management. The agreement will be in force for a period of five years.

The programme also covers petroleum technology and transfer of technology, including setting up of pilot plants by India and Mexico.

India and Mexico have agreed to set up an Indo-Mexican Joint Commission to co-ordinate all activity under the existing agreements between the two countries in the field of science and technology and economic cooperation.

According to an official announcement made at the end of the first of official-level talks held between the two countries here yesterday, a meeting of the officials will take place in Mexico City in August to formalize the actual set up of the commission.

The Mexican President is understood to have accepted an invitation from the President Zail Singh to visit India. According to informed sources, the visit might take place before August this year.

President Zail Singh today sent a personal message to President Ronald Reagan reciprocating the sentiments expressed by him during his brief transit visit in Orlando, Florida, on Sunday. The message was sent through a senior Indian official.

In his letter, Mr Reagan extended a warm welcome to him and expressed his happiness over the good health of Mr Zail Singh who had undergone a successful heart operation in Houston, USA, in 1982. Mr Reagan had also conveyed in his letter his best wishes to Mrs Gandhi and the people of India.

Somdeb Das Gupta adds: Yesterday, when President Zail Singh arrived here, there was a formal ceremony of welcome at the National Palace Before the presentation of the Guard of Honour in the imposing Sixteenth Century building which is deeply associated with memorable events in the history of the country, the strains of the national anthems of Mexico and India reverberated across massive baroque columns, with people crowding outside the gates.

Welcoming Mr Zail Singh, president Miguel de la Madrid saw "a significant distinction" in the fact that the Indian President's first State visit to the American continent was being made to Mexico. He echoed Mr Zail Singh's view that notwithstanding the vast distance between the two countries, his meeting with Mr Zail Singh "is one of two countries which, in their foreign policy, support all efforts to promote international peace, solidarity and cooperation".

What emerged in the course of the first day of the Indian President's three-day visit to Mexico was a sense of affinity on wide-ranging issues, as well as serious anxiety over external interference in the affairs of underdeveloped nations.

Mr Zail Singh underscored this by expressing India's "wholehearted support" for the Contadora initiative which seeks to forestall precisely such outside intervention. He was appreciative, too, of Mexico's efforts as chairman of the Group of 77 to resolve the stalemated North-South dialogue.

Elaborating on this theme at the banquet, the Mexican President was critical of the policy of putting economic pressure on the weaker nations and unequivocally condemned "open or surreptitious, or direct or indirect coercion among nations".

He stressed the urgent need to repudiate efforts to set up security zones and spheres of influence which spurn national border. His country, Mr de la Madrid said, could sort out the crisis in Central America in cooperation with Venezuela, Colombia and Panama.

CSO: 4600/1807

## OFFICIAL SPEAKS AT ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK MEET

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 27 Apr 84 p 2

[Text]

Amsterdam, April 26 (PTT) — India told the Asian Development Bank (ADB) today that despite resilience shown by its economy, which was poised for a near seven per cent growth in 1983-84, it would continue to need an access to development assistance for financing high priority projects and infrastructure development.

At the 17th annual meeting of ADB held here, India's Finance Secretary P K Kaul said that a careful management of economy had reduced India's trade deficit, considerably improved its balance of payments position and foreign exchanges reserves. There was, however, no room for complacency, and considering the magnitude of the task of development, there was little doubt that India needed continued assistance.

Mr Kaul made no direct reference to India's plans to borrow for the first time from ADB, since the annual meeting is not a forum to decide such matters. Despite US reservations, several West European countries and other have supported India's application, and there are indications that it will be able to draw its first loan of around \$100 million later this year.

India plans to make commercial borrowings from ADB and Mr Kaul, in his address, made a pointed reference to the bank's performance in lending from ordinary capital resources (OCR) in 1983 which, he regretted, had shown an increase of a mere 0.4 per cent in nominal terms.

While there was a continuing decline in real terms in quantum of lending from OCR, the rate of interest on loans had at this very time, been raised to a level comparable effectively with rates of interest on com-

mercial borrowings, he said.

Mr Kaul called for "appropriate liberalisation" of lending modalities of ADB, to restore the attractiveness of the bank's operations, and hoped that decline in real terms in lending would be arrested in 1984, and that there would be an increase in coverage of OCR operations of the bank this year.

Referring to the poor growth rate in the bank's lending from ordinary capital resources, Mr Kaul recalled the difficult situation in developing countries, especially non-oil developing countries and said, "It would be no exaggeration to say that what we need today is a kind of Marshall Plan for developing countries".

Mr Kaul also regretted that a number of proposals formulated for liberalisation of the bank's policies in regard to local cost financing, programme lending, financing of interest during construction period and supplementary financing cost overruns, had been watered down.

Recommendations of the bank management on all these matters were eminently reasonable and appropriate to the needs of developing member countries, he said, adding that the policy modifications that had finally emerged, had failed "somewhat short of our expectations".

"We would hope that in actual implementation of these policies the bank will continue to show an understanding and sympathy for problems and requirements of developing member countries", he said.

Another important issue mentioned by the finance secretary, who was speaking in place of Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee who cancelled his visit here at the last minute, was co-financing by commercial

banks. The Association of the bank with commercial sources in co-financing operations was of considerable advantage to commercial banks, he said.

Mr Kaul said that commercial financing was perhaps not the answer for the ills of many developing countries, particularly the non-oil developing countries, for whom concessional assistance remained the paramount need. In the ultimate analysis, there can be no substitute to an expansion of lending authority of the bank itself.

In this context, Mr Kaul suggested that the time had come to review the policy in respect of gearing. Prudence and caution were certainly financial virtues and "we are proud of high reputation enjoyed by the bank in financial circles".

However, India did not consider that the image of the bank would in any way be tarnished by introducing much needed liberalisation in excessively conservative gearing ratio now applied, he said.

Mr Kaul also referred to the technical assistance activities of ADB, including assistance for preparatory project work, and said that it was in appreciation of usefulness of the bank's technical assistance programme that India had been making regular contributions to the special fund for this purpose.

India firmly believed in technical cooperation among developing countries and would like the bank's policies regarding selection of consultants, to keep in mind objectives of permitting such cooperation.

Mr Kaul said that notwithstanding the bank's guidelines, there seemed to be some reluctance to use consultancy services from developing countries. This should be overcome, he said.



PAPER ON BUSH'S VISIT, U.S. POLICY

GF211353 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 18 May 84 p 3

[Editorial: "George Bush's Visit to Pakistan"]

[Excerpts] The U.S. vice president will leave Lahore for Oman at [the] conclusion of his visit to Pakistan and soon the details of his discussions on bilateral issues as well as the affairs of the region will be released.

Basically, the U.S. vice president's utterances in Delhi and Islamabad are of a very official nature, but what is important from Pakistan's point of view is that whether India's clamor and threatening attitude--which have become more vociferous and intense by using the pretext of the sale of U.S. arms to Pakistan--has waned after Mr George Bush's assurances to the Indian leaders during his sojourn to that country.

Even now, the policy of the Indian leaders as well as their efforts and wish is that Islamabad accept Delhi's superiority in defense and foreign policy matters. Washington does not seem to differ from the Indian leaders either. But the Soviet Union is overtly supporting the Indian rulers, while the only change in U.S. policy that has taken place after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is, that Pakistan should be strengthened so that it can play its part in preventing the Soviet Union from reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and in defending the interests of the United States and its Western allies vis-a-vis gulf oil. If the Soviet Union wishes to bring India under its influence, then India is also reciprocating by supporting the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan on the international level.

When it is a question of choosing between Pakistan and India, the United States' first consideration is not to antagonize India in view of its global interests, and to which it adopts a sycophantic attitude and the influential Zionist lobby embarks upon overt support of India, because it considers Pakistan a Muslim country and hence the brother and supporter of the Arab countries which are opposed to the expansionism and animosity of Israel.

Thus, a realistic attitude demands that we should set our own house in order To attain greater internal and national unity for safeguarding our freedom and security and no undertaking should be accepted which might jeopardize our relations with Islamic countries or our nonaligned status on the basis of the United States' mercurial assurances. Such relations with the United States must not be courted which might become a source of provocation for the danger knocking at our doors.

PAPER ON RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA

GF191500 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 10 May 84 p 4

[Editorial: "President Ceausescu's Visit to Pakistan"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Romania has a unique status, that is, in spite of being a socialist country it is free from pressure from big powers and in world and regional problems it adopts a totally free and nonaligned attitude. It is on this account that Romania, though it is a socialist country, has opposed the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. President Ceausescu has been leading the ruling party in Romania for the last 19 years and has also been the head of the country for the same period. In this position he is considered to be a highly experienced, wise and a prudent leader. He has been a leading figure in maintaining this unique role of his country among the socialist countries.

At a reception held in his honor at the presidential palace, President Ceausescu in his speech stressed the fact that there should be no interference in the domestic affairs of others and that the arms race among big powers should cease forthwith. All bilateral differences, he said, should be resolved through peaceful talks and the developed countries should promote cooperation among themselves.

He is justified in saying that growing interference in the domestic affairs of others by foreign powers has created a very dangerous situation in the world. Referring to bilateral relations, President Ceausescu hoped that his visit will strengthen economic and social relations between the two countries. Mutual cooperation will also grow in the fields of science, technology, electronics, railways, transportation and agriculture. He also believed that his talks with General Ziaul Haq will strengthen relations between the two countries and that these talks will also help in international understanding and peace.

President General Ziaul Haq also welcomed the visit of President Ceausescu and expressed great concern that the use of force was creating a dangerous situation in the region as well as in the world. There is tension between West and East and the nuclear arms race has reached a fearful stage. Big powers were busy widening their circles of influence and the world recession has created economic problems for the developing countries.

He praised President Ceausescu's efforts toward promoting peace and understanding in the world, especially in Europe. He said that the relations between Pakistan and Romania were a clear proof of the fact that if two countries sincerely wished to cooperate with each other then ideological differences and social systems cannot stand in the way of such cooperation.

The ideas expressed by the two leaders on the subject of world and regional problems have a deep similarity with each other. Both leaders are equally determined to further strengthen the existing bilateral relations between the two countries. This similarity and closeness is a strong foundation for the further promotion of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. We are certain that President Ceausescu's visit will strengthen the efforts made to end the effects of the tension existing in the world and there will be further progress in economic cooperation between the two countries. As far as the commercial field is concerned, there has been a regular increase in the volume of trade between the two countries, and this trade is in the mutual interest. However, there are many fields in the industrial sector which can use the joint resources of the two countries. Both leaders are pinpointing the sectors in which the joint ministerial commission could pave the way for mutual cooperation.

CSO: 4656/153

# INDIAN COMMENTATOR ANALYZES PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in English 25 May 84 p 5

[Article by Rajendra Sareen: "Pak Foreign Policy--An Indian Perspective: The Four Principal Options"; article appears in "Weekly English Section" of newspaper]

[Text] This is the first of two articles by Rajendra Sareen, Editor of Public Opinion Trends Analyses and News service (New Delhi) based on extracts from his latest book 'Pakistan--The India FACTOR', The book is scheduled to be published by Allied Publishers (P) Ltd. next week.

In the realm of foreign policy Pakistan has four principal options: the first is to go along with the U.S.A. The second is to make a 180-degree turn and get closer to the Soviet Union. The third is to build a cooperative relationship with India and function as a power in the subcontinent. It figures way down in the list of the ruling junta's priorities and as such it is no more than a theoretical probability at present.

The fourth turned out to be only a pipedream. Pakistan most fervently desired to emerge as the kingpin of an Islamic bloc but the idea was a non-started because of antagonisms and cleavages among the countries concerned. So the economic and military linkages with Saudi Arabia and the G.C.C. are in fact components of its U.S. connection.

## Motive

What is the U.S. motive behind seeking a security relationship with Pakistan? Most political leaders, diplomats and commentators agree that it is the strategic location of the country. Formal positions apart, the more perceptive among them frankly formulate the position more or less in terms of what Mir Ghous Baksh Bizerjo said on this issue: "Pakistan is important to the West because it is at the mouth of the Gulf. Should a situation develop in which the importance of the Gulf is finished, what would remain of the significance of the mouth? If Iran turns pro-Soviet and improves its relations with Moscow or invites it to come in, then all these issues of Afghanistan and Pakistan will evaporate into thin air."

As a logical inference of this approach, there is a tendency among political leaders and experts, who view things from the traditional Pakistani angle,

that Pakistan would be making an error by not making the best of this opportunity because it might not last very long. But at the same time there is an acute awareness arising from the past experience that the U.S.A. is an unreliable ally which would use Pakistan but do nothing to help it in its pursuit of armed parity with India.

When Pakistan decided in June, 1981, to enter into an economic aid and military sales programme with the U.S.A., it looked as if the military junta had finally abandoned the pretence of keeping an equidistant position in its relations with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. But the sharp reaction among the people of Pakistan in the wake of that development prompted second thoughts both among the military junta and in the U.S.A.

Almost immediately after James Buckley's parleys with Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in Islamabad--on the conclusion of which the U.S.A. announced its readiness to supply F-16 planes--there were reports of widespread uneasiness even within the military establishment of Pakistan over what the harvest might be of this involvement with the U.S.A.

Buckley left Pakistan on June 16, 1981. On June 21 Agha Shahi made an unscheduled visit to Peshawar, cancelling some previously fixed engagements to address the top brass of the Pakistan Air Force on matters concerning this development. On June 22 he again had to rush to Lahore to address the top military brass and civil servants. Soon thereafter he addressed military officers at Multan, Karachi and other places. This was followed by a visit to Quetta on June 30.

The theme that reportedly ran through all these briefings--like the published comment on the issue in the media by officials and analysts--was that Pakistan had not undertaken a quid pro quo for the American officer. Going by the language of Agha Shahi's articulation and the ominous silence General Zia maintained, it would appear there was widespread concern in the country that by getting mixed up with American objectives in the region Pakistan might provoke the Soviet Union.

#### U.S. Connection

Agha Shahi's marathon address at the seminar organised by the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (C.P.N.E.) at Lahore on June 30, 1981, on "whether the renewal of the U.S. connection is conducive to the national interest" turned out to be an eye opener. Confronted with the massive criticism on the issue of getting tied up with American objectives. Agha Shahi tried to blunt the attack by arguing that Pakistan would take full advantage of its new strategic importance but would not become part of the U.S. strategy. The Americans took a very dim view of this enunciation.

Against this background General Zia's acceptance of Agha Shahi's resignation on February 16, 1982, assumes special significance.

There is a story to the effect that the resignation had been pending since November, 1981, but its acceptance was announced within hours of Agha Shahi's agreement not to press it. When the announcement came on the radio he was



presiding over a meeting at the Foreign Office convened after conveying to Ghulam Ishaq Khan his decision to withdraw his resignation.

Later, Ishaq Khan explained that he had not been able to report his conversation with Agha Shahi to the President before the latter announced his acceptance of the resignation.

This hardly sounds credible. In all probability, the announcement came within hours of Ghulam Ishaq Khan's communicating to General Zia Agha Shahi's willingness to stay on.

General Zia's Washington visit in December, 1982, revived the speculation that Pakistan would go along with the U.S.A. all the way. Prior to his visit, Washington had dropped hints that it would stand no nonsense and might write him off in favour of somebody more cooperative. For the time being, Zia seems to have succeeded in assuaging the U.S. concern, but the basic problem remains. Total identification with the U.S.A. would be very unpopular in Pakistan.

#### Error

With the advantage of hindsight, it would now appear that the military junta had already decided to exercise what it considered its U.S. option when India's Foreign Minister Narashinha Rao went to Islamabad in June, 1981. Its members seem to have erred crucially in assuming that in pursuit of the Reagan Administration's policy of confronting the Soviet Union the U.S.A. would let Pakistan call the shots in South-West Asia.

I am inclined to believe that the American offer of 40 F-16 aircraft, besides other hardware, was an operational necessity. If Pakistan is to play a role in the Gulf, its defence personnel have to be familiar with the equipment used by the R.D.F. and the countries of the G.C.C.

And if Pakistan is to be used as a base in certain contingencies, it must have ground facilities and ancillary services tailored to the equipment used by the U.S. forces. In political terms, the supply of equipment could be part of an effort to foreclose Pakistan's meanderings, seeking a modus vivendi with the U.S.S.R. rather than an act of submission to Pakistan by signing on the dotted line.

Pakistan's desperate hurry to get the F-16s might be connected with its nuclear programme. Possibly, it is close to the stage of an explosion and wanted to get a suitable carrier before a nuclear device was detonated.

An analysis of media reports on the state of the U.S.-Pak relations indicates that there are vast areas of uncertainty which continue to surface, much too frequently. Throughout 1982 American academicians, journalists and Congressional staff experts dealing with South Asia were persistently probing the nature and extent of Zia's ongoing contacts with the Soviet Union.

The General's talks in June, 1982, on Afghanistan under the aegis of the special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General caused much concern to the Americans.

## Anticlimax

After a series of reports striking an optimistic note on the progress made at Geneva it came as a bit of an anticlimax when Cardovez, the U.S. Secretary-General's representative, announced in June, 1983, that the talks had been adjourned *sic* *die*.

It has not escaped the perceptive observers of Pakistan that the U.S.A. has kept the military junta on a short leash. The provision for the annual Congressional review of the five-year economic aid and military sales programme of \$3.2 billion is widely believed to be primarily aimed at retaining an institutional leverage on a continuing basis to keep Pakistan in line.

It would appear that the U.S.A. wants Pakistan to fall in line in four ways:

(a) create and upgrade port and other infrastructural facilities on the Mekran coast near Gwadar so that if the U.S.A. decides to act in the Gulf area, these could be used by its forces;

(b) give an understanding that should it become necessary, Pak troops would be made available to fight in pursuit of U.S. interests in the Gulf area;

(c) reassure the U.S.A. on the nature of its relations with Iran and the extent to which it would go in search of a solution to the Afghan problem. Should the U.S.A. decide to escalate the insurgency in Afghanistan, it would expect Pakistan to give up its inhibitions and cooperate openly instead of acting clandestinely. If the U.S.A. decides to act in Iran, it would want Pakistan to play its allotted role by providing a passage to its forces and, if necessary, make fighting troops available; and,

(d) in order to make one or more of these propositions feasible, improve its relations with India because Pakistan can play no worthwhile role in the Gulf if it remains in active adversary relationship with India.

CSO: 4600/573

## PAPER COMMENTS ON INDIAN 'PROPAGANDA'

GF231656 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 11 May 84 p 3

[Editorial: "India's New Mischievous Propaganda"]

[Text] India has again made Pakistan the target of its baseless and mischievous accusations, by saying that Pakistan has violated its land and air space and that it has supplied arms to saboteurs in its Punjab Province. The Foreign Office of Pakistan has recently denied India's charges that Pakistan has violated its airspace in eastern Punjab or in the Indian-occupied Kashmir. The Indian defense minister has lodged another charge against Pakistan and has told the Indian parliament that Pakistan has concentrated a large part of its armed forces on its borders with India and that Pakistan, in its recent army maneuvers, had tested some of the most sophisticated arms which it has obtained from the United States. Another charge levied against Pakistan is that it has opened fire 35 times on the Kashmir control line. In order to frighten the local and world public opinion, he has also said that India was keeping a close watch on Pakistan's nuclear preparedness and is also working on retaliatory measures. The All-India Radio has also manufactured a news item that the arms which have been captured from the India Sikh terrorists in Amritsar, Ludhiana, and Firozpur bear Pakistani marks.

This mischievous propaganda has a number of motives. First, the deteriorating situation in eastern Punjab has put the Indira Gandhi regime into a tight corner and it has no other trick to fool its population except to blame Pakistan for the situation in Punjab and to frighten the people with talk of a possible attack by Pakistan. Moreover, India has chosen a time for this baseless accusation when the Vice President George Bush is about to pay a visit to both India and Pakistan. The Indira Gandhi regime wants the U.S. administration to believe that the arms which are being supplied to Pakistan have created an atmosphere of confrontation in the subcontinent. Mr Narsimha Rao has already said that the topic of the supply of U.S. arms to Pakistan will top the agenda for talks with Mr Bush. To give credence to this stance, India is creating a tense situation on its borders with Pakistan.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan protested on 21 April against the opening of fire by Indian units on the northern regions of the Azad Kashmir. In reply, the Indian Army fired on a Pakistani helicopter which was on routine flight within the airspace of the Azad Kashmir; 2 days later India accused

Pakistan of violating its airspace in Firozpur and the occupied Kashmir area. This is an old trick of India and it is a very mean trick. The surprising thing in this connection is that this mischievous propaganda is being launched at a time when the foreign ministers of the two countries are about to hold talks on Pakistan's proposal of a nonaggression pact to normalize relations between the two countries. Thus, it is clear that the Indira Gandhi regime is not in the least interested in durable stability in the subcontinent. It is deliberately creating tension on its borders to achieve domestic and political ends. Therefore, we are certain that the Indira Gandhi regime will not succeed in its efforts to influence either the U.S. administration or Indian public opinion against Pakistan. The Indian defense minister's claim that India was fully aware of the nuclear weapons that Pakistan has in its possession, is in fact mischief which is only meant to turn U.S. public opinion against Pakistan. However, the U.S. administration is now fully convinced that Pakistan's nuclear program is nothing but a program for peaceful purposes and India cannot derive any benefit from this mischievous propaganda.

CSO: 4656/153

PAPER STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

GF190703 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 3 May 84

[Editorial: "It Would Be Better To Consult The Soviet Union"]

[Excerpts] The Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate has proposed that prior to any arms supply to Pakistan or any other country of the subcontinent, it should first consult India and it should not alienate India. This is contained in the report presented by this committee to President Reagan on the subject of foreign affairs.

The proposal by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate can only be interpreted in this way, that is, before making any pacts or deals with Pakistan, the Soviet Union should also be consulted because despite their lavish proclamations of being nonaligned and free thinking, the Indian rulers during Mrs Gandhi's tenure have been nothing more than subordinates of the Soviet Union and its agents.

Therefore, the situation demands that despite assurances that the Reagan government will keep its promise, Pakistan should not rely on the United States completely, but should consolidate its defenses and safeguard its territorial integrity by giving priority to increasing its own strength.

Hence, while the goodwill of the neighbors, especially the friendship of the Islamic and nonaligned countries, is important, internal national unity should also be achieved because the war for the country's freedom and safety has to be fought by the nation itself.

CSO: 4656/153



QADIANI BAN: REGIME SEEN CONFUSING STATE, RELIGION

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 3 May 84 p 5

[Editorial: "State and Religion"]

[Text]

NOT for the first time in Pakistan's troubled history, it has been considered necessary for the State to interfere in religious matters that are in dispute between different communities or sects. The new Presidential Ordinance, relating to what are described as the anti-Islamic activities of the Qadianis, is a follow-up of the 1974 constitutional amendment which laid down that because their beliefs run counter to the Muslims' abiding faith in the finality of the Prophethood of Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him) the Ahmedis of both sects, Qadianis and Lahoris, could not be accepted as Muslims and should, henceforth, be treated as a non-Muslim minority. It has now been decreed by amending the Penal Code that the Ahmedis will, under pain of punishment, be barred, directly or indirectly, from referring to themselves as Muslims or calling their place of worship a mosque or using the Azan — the Muslim call to prayer — as their call for the same purpose. Nor can the Ahmedis propagate by word of mouth or writing or visible representation their religion with a view to

converting others. They are also barred from using the nomenclature or appellations associated with the Holy Prophet or his family for a member of the Ahmedi community or anyone else. On the last occasion, Government's action had followed an agitation on the matter by a group of ulema; presently, the official initiative was presumably meant to pre-empt such a campaign. Even if such action is demanded or taken in the name of religion, and whether the motivations are religious or political or a combination of both, the measure should normally be subjected to rational discussion — preferably in a representative assembly — before any irrevocable decision is taken. Faced with a *fait accompli*, it becomes difficult to argue whether the action was really necessary and unavoidable even on the premises adumbrated by the law-maker, or whether it is in consonance with the Constitution or the UN Charter of Human Rights. It also needs to be considered whether such issues can finally be determined by law, as well as the possibility that the process may not stop at any one

stage and even minor differences among religions and sects can lead us to dissension and strife.

In accordance with the basic tenets of the Constitution and generally-accepted postulates of modern law, restrictions relating to religious practices or rituals are justifiable only on the ground that the activity prohibited tends to hurt the feelings of other citizens or may create inter-communal or inter-sect tensions that could disturb the peace of the land. Otherwise there can be no bar on any citizen believing or practising the religion of his choice. This fundamental principle is in complete accord with the views enunciated by the Quaid-e-Azam which not only form the foundation of a nation State but help to promote national unity and integrity. Most people in Pakistan hold the view, therefore, that the State must, without any discrimination, act as protector of the rights of all citizens without regard to their creed or sect, and to guarantee equal rights to all in every secular matter as well as complete freedom to practise and follow their religion. Thus, it would appear that the demands now being made

by certain ulema for depriving all Ahmedi citizens of key Government positions or for organising a social boycott against them are inappropriate and unjustified. Particularly in view of the fact that the Ahmedis have accepted the restrictive law and have pledged themselves to abide by it, the majority community should exhibit the tolerance and magnanimity that are part of the best Islamic tradition. This attitude is also necessary to inculcate a healthy nationalism that allows people of all persuasions to work together for the country's prosperity and stability. It need hardly be stressed that the safety of all minorities — the protection of their lives, honour and property — is a primary duty of the State and civilised society. Finally, the warning given recently by a well-known religious leader that pursuit of communal or sectarian quarrels can only cause confusion and weaken the national cause deserves to be heeded. And it should be remembered that the zealots among different sects can, if their activities are not checked by good sense, lead the people into one crisis after another to the nation's lasting detriment.

## PROPOSAL TO SET UP DISTRICT PRESS COMMITTEES DENOUNCED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 3 May 84 p 8

[Article in the "Between the Lines" column: "Vigilante Committees"]

[Text]

ONE HOPES that the CMLA-President's off-the-cuff remarks, at the Urdu Digest Seminar on National Integrity, about setting up district committees to deal with the waywardness of the Press were either misreported or that — in order to avoid adding to the prevailing confusion — the purported decision will be reconsidered.

Already the Press in Pakistan is burdened with a number of special laws intended to ensure that all newspapers and publications follow the strait and narrow path. Of these, Ayub Khan's Press and Publications Ordinance is, perhaps, the most comprehensive; it lays down a carefully-devised system for dealing summarily, almost arbitrarily, with any infringement by a newspaper of a wide variety of offences. This law has been a target of attack and agitation for two decades. Then a number of Martial Law Regulations cover related or similar offences by a publisher or editor.

### The machinery

As for the machinery designed to enforce these and other laws, the district administrations, helped by the Press Branches, are fairly vigilant and seldom fail to detect any possible breach. Their functioning is guided and overseen by the provincial Information Departments, with their major adjuncts. The expanding Public Relations net-work, ostensibly intended to perform PR functions, devotes a great

deal of its time and resources to keeping a check on the printed word, with a view to curbing any tendency that may be suspect in the eyes of Authority. Then all other Government Departments, including the Police, the various Intelligence agencies, the Martial Law authorities, are fairly sensitive to what is written about them or on other matters that reflect on their functioning. All of them keep their eyes wide open.

### Watchdogs not necessary

This elaborate net-work is served by a variety of laws affecting the Press, apart from the ordinary law of the land which is applicable to the Press in the same way as it is to any citizen. And since the machinery of the State seems to function with a little more efficiency in the matter of newspapers than in many other matters, the establishment of special vigilante committees seems to be unnecessary. The proposal is that these committees should comprise members of the Provincial and Federal Councils belonging to the district; and they will be assisted by representatives of the local administration. Those among the Councillors who are literate will naturally be expected to read newspapers published or circulated in the district, and point out to the committee any violation of the law or decency or morality. In particular, they will be asked to look out for anything opposing the Ideology of Pakistan. And apart from

these guide-lines they will naturally seek to save from attack their personal or other vested interests. It is also likely that the norms established will differ from district to district among fifty old committees. What is even more surprising, one newspaper report carries the suggestion that these committees will be authorised to burn the newspapers or magazines which they consider to be objectionable. At what and whose cost?

It seems plain that these committees are not needed to ensure compliance with the law. What is more, they are not likely to be able to perform this duty with any merit, and the only result will be to establish yet another district committee where the official convener will be expected to perform its functions and periodically obtain the approval of its doubly-nominated membership.

CSO: 4600/573

# APPEAL FOR PRISONERS' RELEASE PUBLISHED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 3 May 84 p 14

[Text]

THE following Press release has been issued by the Prisoners' Welfare Association, Lahore:

A large number of political prisoners are being kept in the Central Prison, Haripur (NWFP). They include detainees who are awaiting trial as well as those who have been convicted by Military Courts. However, the bulk of them belong to the first category. They have been in detention for periods ranging up to three years or even more. A majority of them have been charged under Section 120-B PPC and MLR 18, vide FIR No. 204 East Peshawar, but throughout this extended period of their detention none of them has ever been produced in a court of law. Even the normal procedure for the extension of judicial remand is not followed in these cases.

The other group comprises convicted political prisoners. The military courts have passed their verdicts and there is nothing they can do about it. In some cases appeals made to the Martial Law authorities have not been heard.

The plight of these political prisoners deserves the attention of all humanist, liberal, progressive and democratic elements in society, the Press release says, especially since the hardships faced by detenus in the Punjab have recently been highlighted.

The following is the list of political prisoners, the place they belong to and the period of detention:

Imtiaz Alam, Bahawalpur, 34 months; Sher Ali Bacha, Mardan, 34 months; Abdul Naeem, Advocate, Swabi, 25 months; Babu Fazal Khaliq, Peshawar, 23 months; Isa Khan, Peshawar, 6 months; Zar Mohammad, Peshawar, 23 months; Jehanzeb, Peshawar, 22 months; Kamran Haider Kiani, Khanpur, 28 months; Bunyad Hussain, Peshawar, 2 months; Asif Butt, Sialkot, 34 months; Mohammad Ali, Kurram Agency, 35 months; Inam Khan, Kohat, 22 months; Jehangeer Khan, Kohat, 16 months; Shams-ul Haq, Charsada, 13 months; Meer Ahmad, Charsada, 6 months; Zafar, Charsada, 2 months; Jehangeer Khan, Charsada, 2 months; Arif Kamal, Charsada, 2 months; Shoaib Saqib, Charsada, 2 months; Ghulam Ali, Parachinar, 4 months; Iqbal Hussain, Parachinar, 10 months; Sabir Hussain, Parachinar, 10 months; Jafar Ali, Parachinar, 10 months; Shah Baba, Peshawar, 26 months; Lal Mohammad, Peshawar, 6 months; Shah Rehman, Peshawar, 49 months, convicted for 14 years R.I.; Gul Baz, Tribal Area, 21 months; Ajar Khan, T.A., 21 months; Hikmat Shah, T.A., 22 months; Sikandar, T.A., 22 months; Ghazi, T.A., 21 months; Said Mohammad Umar, T.A., 8 months; Amir M. Wahiz, T.A., 49 months, convicted for 14 years R.I.; Mohabat Khan, Charsada, 29 months; Bakht Mohammad, Charsada, 24 months; Rahim Dad Khan, Charsada, 18 months; Ismail Khan, Charsada, 22 months; Gul Bacha, Charsada, 17 months; Ajab Gul, Charsada, 16 months; Zahir Shah, Charsada, 16 months; Mohammad Zada, Charsada, 19 months; Dr. Masood, Charsada, 31 months; Mohammad Jan, Charsada, 6 months; Gul Jan, Mardan, 21 months; Mohib Gul, Mardan, 34 months; Iqbal Zahid, Mardan, 2 months; Asi Hashtnagri, Mardan, 20 months; Malik Tammas, Mohmand Agency, 21 months; Jan Said, Mohmand, 4 months; Mohammad Ikram, Lahore, 24 months; Masod Iqbal, Lahore, 34 months (convicted for 14 years R.I.); Ihsan Nabi, Malakand, 25 months; Noor Mohammad, Malakand, 27 months; Akhwan Zada, Dir, 21 months; Bakht Zaman, Dir, 25 months; Aijazulhaq, Karachi, 22 months; Saleem Jan, Karachi,



4 months; Khalil Qureshi, Karachi, 35 months; Gul Hussain, Parachinar, 17 months; Qadam Ali, Parachinar, 20 months; Said Mohammad, Chitral, 4 months; Rustam Ali, Gujranwala, 7 months; M. Jawad Hussain, Sialkot, 6 months; Ghulam Mustafa, Rawalpindi, 6 months; Wazeer Gul, Peshawar, 6 months; Said Mohammad, Miran Shah, 23 months; Umer Zada, Swat, 27 months; Mohammad Ghulam, Kurram Agency, 22 months; Dr. Mohammad Salim, Ghazi (Hazara), 29 months (convicted for three years); Masood Afridi, Khyber Agency, 25 months; Master Mir Ali Shah, Bannu, 16 months; Ghazi Gul, Khuber Agency, 19 months; Bakht Jan, Waziristan, 23 months; Majeed Khan, Kohat, 32 months; Tariq Zeeshan, Abbottabad, MRD detainee 8 months; Kundi, D.I. Khan, MRD detainee 8 months; Noor Rehman, Darband (Hazara) 56 months; (Total 77 detainees).

CSO: 4600/573

# MRD LEADER PROPOSES FRONT IN SIND TO SECURE PRISONERS' RELEASE

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 3 May 84 p 15

[Text] RAO ABDUR RASHID, Secretary-General of the Punjab MRD, has proposed that the MRD should organise a 'marcha' in Sind to secure the release of all political detenus, instead of issuing routine appeals that they be freed.

Addressing a Press conference here last week, the provincial Secretary-General of the MRD said, "We should give a deadline to the Government and demand before that date the release of all political prisoners, including not only the MRD leaders but also the large number of students who have been recently arrested as well as other political figures who had been sentenced to long terms under false cases. "If these persons are not released by a specific date, Punjabi politicians and political workers should start courting arrest from various places in Sind. If we cannot get our Sindhi brothers out, we can at least all be with them in the jails in Sind and thus partially compensate for our failing in the last movement", he added.

## Immediate Problem

He said the immediate problem confronting the MRD was the release of its central leadership, especially those belonging to Sind, because unless all its leaders were freed and available for a frank discussion it would not be possible to deliberate on the far-reaching issues likely to confront the nation in the weeks ahead. He said if important leaders, including Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto, Mr. Resul Bakhsh Palejo, Mr. Khaliquzzaman, Mr. Jeraj Mohammad Khan and Mr. Fatehyab Ali Khan, all belonging to Sind which was in the forefront of the MRD struggle and offered the greatest sacrifices, were not available, "it would be impossible for us to evolve a cohesive course of action".

Rao Rashid said there were many important politicians from Punjab and NWFP who were still in prison. Except for two months, Mr. Mukhtar Awan was continuously in jail for three years. Same was the case of Rozi Khan, Haji Rashid Anwar and Rashid Mian who had not yet been released.

## Asghar Khan

He said that in the NWFP, the most glaring case was that of Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan who had been under detention for five long years, Maj.-Gen Nasirullah

Babar and Mr Aftab Sherpao were still under house arrest. So was the case in Baluchistan where many of our leaders like Mr. Khudai Nur, Mr. Ali Ahmad Kurd, Amanullah Gichki and Khalid Khan were still in jail.

Replying to a question he said that he would put the proposal of organising a 'morcha' in Sind in the Central Executive meeting of MRD to be held in Lahore on May 7.

#### Awan's Release Urged

A MEETING of the General House of the Lahore High Court Bar Association, held on April 26, with Khan A. Hameed Khan, Vice-President, in the chair, has demanded the immediate release of Mr. Mukhtar Awan Advocate.

A unanimous resolution said Mr. Awan's release was necessary because he was suffering from a head injury.

It also resolved that a committee nominated by the President of Bar might also be formed to pressurise the Government to release Mr. Awan and other political prisoners without delay.

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PAPER COMMENTS ON PRESS RESTRICTIONS

GF221635 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 12 May 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Internal National Unity and the Role of Newspapers"]

[Excerpts] President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq has said that the best guarantee for the safety of Pakistan can only be given by its people and if its 80 million people remain united, no external power would even dare to cast a covetous eye. He said this while he was speaking to correspondents at Karachi airport some days ago.

The country's 80 million people can only play their part in the defense of their country's security through organizations and institutions in which not only must the people participate, but they must be assured that these groupings reflect their true aspirations and wishes and can project them faithfully and lead them forward. If there are no elected parliaments or assemblies, and there are restrictions on political parties, at least newspapers can perform the obligation of presenting the people's opinions to a certain extent, if they are free and considered free to do so by the people.

The issue is, if the newspapers are banned from doing so, then they can only present a unilateral view of things, that is, the government's point of view. So how will they be able to play the part which the president considers necessary to foster national unity and identify antinational elements? This question is extremely important, since, once again, restrictions have been clamped on any kind of political reportage. These new restrictions on newspapers give rise to the question: What were the defunct political parties doing? What was the effect of the reporting of their activities in the newspapers or of their points of view? Apart from their differences with the government, they were also bickering with each other and were involved in airing their grievances against one another, which was not having any positive effect on the public. In any case, the opinions of those who did not agree with the government were being made public and the people were being aided in forming their own opinions. Now these restrictions which have been reiterated in Section 49 of the martial law regulations will only allow the airing of the official point of view and create a false sense of security. Thus "unity in discord" will not be present which makes for greater national solidarity and is its real foundation. The more this happens, the wider will be the chasm of the people's diffidence. When the common man does not see any sign of his hopes and aspirations in the

newspapers, his confidence will be shaken; whispering, rumors, and misunderstandings will be rampant and the tendency to resort to foreign media will also increase, which usually exaggerates and sensationalizes news.

Whatever the matter, or the advantages of thought or deed, reality always comes to the fore and cannot be hidden, because "only that is beautiful that the free people consider beautiful." [Urdu proverb]

CSO: 4656/153



## BRIEFS

ZIA INTERVIEWED BY EGYPTIAN WEEKLY--President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq has stressed the need for efforts toward realizing the greater objective of the Islamic unity, which is neither difficult not impossible. In an interview with Egyptian weekly (AL-MUSAWWIR), he condemned the conspiracies for giving Jewish identity to Al-Quds Al-Sharif and said any effort toward changing the identity of Al-Quds would be an open violation of the UN resolutions and would hurt the religious feelings of the Islamic world. Referring to Egyptian efforts for ending the Iran-Iraq war, the president said all possible methods should be utilized to establish peace. The president once again stressed the need for a political solution to the Afghanistan problem. He expressed the hope that India would take effective steps to further improve the atmosphere of confidence in smaller countries of the region, including Pakistan. He described Pakistan's relations with Bangladesh as very good. [Text] [BK191134 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 19 May 84]

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